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This paper presents evidence that non-bank-originated subprime mortgages have a higher probability of 
default than bank-originated subprime mortgages, but only for loans with prepayment penalties.   
Evidence also indicates that non-banks price prepayment penalties less favorably to borrowers than banks 
do, and non-banks originate disproportionately more loans with prepayment penalties in locales with less 
financially sophisticated borrowers.  State anti-predatory lending law provisions restricting the use of 
prepayment penalties eliminate the elevated default risk of non-bank originations relative to bank 
originations.  These findings are consistent with incentives generated by non-bank compensation via yield 
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 1. Introduction 
  Of broad concern for our understanding of the recent foreclosure crisis and for housing and 
financial stability moving forward is the role of compensation incentives across origination channels in 
mortgage lending.  The specific aspect of this concern addressed in this paper is whether and why 
subprime loans originated by relatively less-supervised non-depository institution mortgage originators 
(“non-banks”) performed worse than subprime loans originated by depository institutions (“banks”) 
primarily supervised by one of the federal financial regulatory agencies:  the Federal Reserve, Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS), or National Credit Union Association.
1  Results indicate that non-bank originations 
have a higher probability of default than bank originations, but only for loans that include prepayment 
penalties.  This is the first evidence linking greater default risk across origination channels to a specific 
loan feature, and is consistent with a greater importance of yield spread premiums (YSPs) in 
compensation among non-bank originators than bank originators.  The paper then presents further 
evidence that disparities by origination channel in pricing prepayment penalties, borrower financial 
sophistication, and the role of anti-predatory lending laws are also consistent with differing compensation 
incentives. 
  The growth of subprime lending in the United States in the years leading to the recent financial 
crisis coincided with rapid growth in non-bank origination, with large majorities of subprime mortgages 
being originated by non-banks.
2  Even before the crisis, some characteristics of non-bank mortgage 
origination aroused concerns about the quality of loans produced through that channel.  Because non-bank 
originators are not depository institutions, they are not subject to the close supervision of one of the 
federal financial regulatory agencies listed above, but instead fall only under the less extensive 
                                                 
1 Many examinations of mortgage lending by origination channel distinguish between originations by direct lenders 
(“retail”) and by brokers (“wholesale”).  Here, non-bank originations include both broker originations and 
originations by direct lenders that are not depository institutions.  As is explained in Section 4, the use of this 
categorization of origination channel is determined by data availability. 
2 Sixty-nine percent of the loans in this paper’s sample, which includes subprime originations from 2002-2006, are 
non-bank-originated.  
  1supervision of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and various state authorities, 
the implication being that with less oversight non-bank originators are more likely than banks to engage 
in abusive practices to the detriment of borrowers.
3  Non-banks, which include brokers, are also more 
likely than banks to practice an “originate-to-distribute” business model in which mortgages are sold 
shortly after origination to another financial institution, usually to be packaged into mortgage-backed 
securities.
4  This reduces an originator’s interest in the long-term performance of the loans, and so 
increases the incentive to apply less rigorous underwriting standards. 
Further, the compensation received by different types of originators is a source of controversy.  
While much of a broker’s compensation is in the form of cash payments directly from the borrower (such 
as an origination fee based on a percentage of the loan amount and various application or processing 
fees), a YSP is paid to a broker by the institution to which the broker sells the loan.
5  The size of a YSP is 
based on the difference between the loan interest rate and a benchmark rate for loans with similar 
characteristics set by the purchasing institution, giving brokers the incentive to place borrowers in more 
expensive loans.  Consumer advocates consider originator compensation that increases with interest rates 
to be an inherently abusive practice that leads directly to subprime borrowers being steered into higher 
interest rate loans and therefore to more defaults.  Proponents argue that due to competition in mortgage 
lending, YSPs from loan buyers are passed through to borrowers via reduced fees, allowing borrowers to 
exchange a higher interest rate for lower upfront costs. 
A mortgage loan officer employed by a direct lending institution generally also has an incentive 
to place a borrower in a loan with a higher interest rate than a benchmark rate for similar loans set by the 
loans officer’s institution.  Compensation based on a higher interest rate of this sort from a direct lender is 
termed an overage rather than a YSP, but overages and YSPs are economically equivalent – the person 
                                                 
3 In the years leading up to the foreclosure crisis, many bank holding companies acquired independent non-bank 
mortgage origination firms.  In 2009, the Federal Reserve extended its regulatory reach to encompass non-bank 
subsidiaries of bank holding companies, bringing many subprime originators under closer federal supervision. 
4 Lenders that plan to hold the loans they originate on their books also frequently securitize their loans in order to 
hold a more liquid mortgage-backed security rather than a less liquid assortment of individual loans. 
5 Jackson and Burlingame (2007) find that on broker-originated loans for which a YSP is present, it is usually the 
largest component of a broker’s compensation. 
  2responsible for originating the loan gets higher compensation while the borrower receives a higher 
interest rate than he or she might otherwise get based on the borrower’s creditworthiness and other loan 
terms. 
Although direct evidence is lacking, there is reason to believe that YSPs play a larger role in the 
compensation of brokers than overages do in the compensation of loan officers at direct lenders.
6  Black 
et al. (2003) note great variation in the use of overages at financial institutions, with some encouraging 
the use of overages in loan officer compensation, others tightly restricting overages, and still others not 
allowing overages to be collected at all.  Woodward (2008) writes that “Traditionally, loan officers are 
paid a salary, plus some bonus for volume, and in the longer run a bonus for the profitability of their book 
of loans.  Mortgage brokers are freelancers who work on commission only.”
7  Higher interest rate loans 
can enhance the profitability of loans on a loan officer’s book, but can also detract from profitability if the 
higher monthly payments prove less affordable to borrowers, leading to more frequent defaults.
8  This 
would mitigate the compensation incentive of overages for loan officers.  Tzioumis and Gee (2010) 
examine mortgage loan officer behavior at a bank that strictly limits overages and employs monthly 
output quotas, and note anecdotal evidence that other banks use similar compensation incentive schemes, 
although they are not specific as to whether the similarity does or not include the overage restrictions.
9  
Restrictions or prohibitions of overages to loan officers and loan officer compensation based on salary 
                                                 
6 In addition to data on loan officer salary, benefit, and bonus schemes, the ideal evidence would entail comparing 
wholesale rate sheets providing the schedule of YSPs a lender would pay a broker for loans of different interest rates 
to retail rate sheets from the same lender providing the same information for the overages available to the lender’s 
own loan officers.  Because rate sheets are generally unavailable to the public, I have been unable to acquire such 
evidence. 
7 Woodward (2008), page 10. 
8 Recent evidence on loan modifications supports a positive relationship between loan interest rates and default 
rates.  Agarwal et al. (2011) find that among loans that become 60 days or more past due, a one percentage point 
reduction in loan interest rates is associated with a four percentage point reduction in redefault.  The most recent 
Mortgage Metrics Report (2010) issued by the OCC and OTS states that loans modified with small or no reductions 
in monthly payments are over twice as likely to both enter and complete the foreclosure process, compared to loans 
modified with monthly payment reductions of ten percent or more.  The report also shows that interest rate 
reductions are much more prevalent in loan modifications than other terms that lower monthly payments, like 
maturity extensions, principal reductions or principal deferrals. 
9 Tzioumis and Gee (2010) find a spike in origination volume near the end of each month.  They find no time-
varying effects on loan pricing, suggesting that the loan officers do not attempt to increase origination volume near 
the end of the month by reducing loan interest rates. 
  3and bonuses that are linked to loan volume or long-run performance diminish the incentive effect of 
overages for loan officers relative to that of YSPs for brokers. 
Woodward (2008) also presents evidence that YSPs and overages are not passed through dollar 
for dollar to customers via reduced fees, and that the amount of pass-through varies by origination 
channel.  In her full sample, borrowers received 22 cents of upfront cost reduction per dollar of YSP from 
bank direct lenders, 29 cents from large non-bank direct lenders (with size determined by the number of 
loans originated by a given lender in her sample), 19 cents from small non-bank direct lenders, and only 7 
cents from brokers.  For the higher interest rate portion of her sample, the differences are more dramatic.  
Borrowers from bank and large non-bank direct lenders received 24 and 33 cents, respectively, while 
borrowers from small non-bank direct lenders and brokers actually paid 21 and 16 cents, respectively, in 
additional upfront costs per dollar of YSP or overage.  Lower pass-through of YSPs/overages implies a 
greater portion of each dollar of YSP/overage available for broker/loan officer compensation, so these 
results suggest that a dollar of YSP or overage represents a greater compensation incentive for brokers 
than for direct lender loan officers, with the incentive for small non-bank loan officers being more similar 
to that of brokers than that of bank loan officers. 
Berndt et al. (2010) and Ernst et al. (2008) provide examples of “rate sheets” that two large 
subprime lenders supplied to brokers providing the amounts each institution was willing to pay for loans 
with various characteristics.  Both sheets explicitly limit the YSP available on broker originations without 
prepayment penalties.  A prepayment penalty requires a borrower to pay a substantial fee if he or she 
repays a loan within a specified length of time after origination.  This directly raises the cost of repaying a 
loan through a refinancing or sale while the prepayment penalty is in effect.  Critics of prepayment 
penalties argue that they can trap a borrower in an expensive mortgage, reducing the borrower’s wealth 
(through either high monthly payments or a large prepayment fee).  Also, for financially distressed 
borrowers who can no longer afford their present mortgages and must choose between prepaying and 
defaulting, increasing the cost of prepayment makes default more likely.  Others argue that prepayment 
  4penalties can increase borrower wealth and make default less likely if lenders offer lower interest rates for 
loans featuring prepayment penalties. 
If a purchasing institution pays a broker a premium for a loan with a high interest rate, the 
purchaser may not recoup that premium through higher monthly payments if the borrower quickly 
refinances into a lower-rate loan.  A prepayment penalty ensures that the purchaser will receive either 
enough higher monthly payments or the penalty fee to recoup the premium paid to the broker.  Berndt et 
al. (2010) find that while for many loans it is hard to determine whether broker profits are driven more by 
YSPs, high borrower valuations of the properties in question, or greater broker bargaining power, in the 
case of “loans with prepayment penalties, the main driver appears to be the yield spread premium.”
10  
Ernst et al. (2008) note that “in many cases lenders do not allow the broker to get any yield-spread 
premium if the loan has no prepayment penalty.”
11  Direct lenders may make the amount of overage 
compensation available to loan officers similarly dependent on prepayment penalties, but I have been 
unable to locate any examples of direct lenders’ retail rate sheets or any descriptions of overage 
compensation being related to prepayment penalties.
12  Absence of evidence is of course not evidence of 
absence, but it is at least suggestive that consumer advocacy groups explicitly link prepayment penalties 
to broker compensation via YSPs but are silent on loan officer compensation via overages (see Ernst et al, 
2008, and Center for Responsible Lending, 2004). 
  This paper presents evidence that non-bank originations have a higher probability of default than 
bank originations, but only among loans that have prepayment penalties.  Considering the discussion of 
YSPs, overages, and prepayment penalties above, this finding is consistent with differing compensation 
incentives being a driving factor in greater default risk for non-bank originations.  Specifically (and 
discussed at greater length in Section 3), the positive relationship between non-bank origination and the 
probability of default will be stronger for loans with prepayment penalties than for loans without 
                                                 
10 Berndt et al. (2010), page 29. 
11 Ernst et al. (2008), page 37. 
12 Both loan officers and brokers are generally prohibited from making rate sheets available to the public, but unlike 
wholesale rate sheets that are transmitted to multiple brokers outside of the purchasing institution, retail rate sheets 
remain within a direct lender’s institution. 
  5prepayment penalties if (1) the amount of YSP available to brokers is conditional on loans having 
prepayment penalties, while the amount of overage for direct lender loan officers is not (or is less often) 
conditional on prepayment penalties, (2) YSPs are a larger share of brokers’ total compensation than 
overages are of loan officers’ compensation, or (3) non-bank originators receive greater compensation per 
dollar of YSP or overage than bank originators do.  The paper then presents a variety of findings 
regarding differences by origination channel in the pricing of prepayment penalties, the financial 
sophistication of borrowers, and the effects of provisions in state anti-predatory lending (APL) laws 
restricting prepayment penalties.  In each case, the results are consistent with what one would expect 
given the different compensation incentives across origination channels. 
  From a historical perspective, this paper expands our understanding of the workings of the 
subprime market in the years leading up to the foreclosure crisis by highlighting how variation across 
origination channels in one particular contract feature was associated with significant differences in loan 
outcomes.  From a current policy perspective, the findings regarding prepayment penalties, defaults, and 
state APL law provisions are immediately relevant to the prospective success of provisions of the recently 
enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
13  The findings are also directly 
informative regarding how origination incentives grounded in compensation practices influence mortgage 
performance. 
  The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 discusses the relevant previous 
literature.  Section 3 presents the paper’s hypotheses.  Section 4 describes the paper’s data sources and the 
econometric methodology employed.  Section 5 presents results from the empirical analysis, and Section 
6 concludes. 
 
                                                 
13 The full text of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act is available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:h4173enr.txt.pdf.  Title XIV 
prohibits prepayment penalties entirely on all ARMs and certain high-priced FRMs.  On all other mortgages, 
prepayment penalties are prohibited three years after origination, with the amount of the penalty in the first, second, 
and third year after origination is limited to 3 percent, 2 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, of the outstanding loan 
balance.  In addition, Title XIV prohibits any compensation to a mortgage originator, like YSPs, for which the 
amount of compensation varies based on any terms of the loan other than the loan amount. 
  62. Literature  Review 
The literature focusing on the effects of origination channel in subprime lending is small but 
growing, spurred in no doubt by the recent foreclosure crisis.  Laderman and Reid (2009), Jiang et al. 
(2009), Ding et al. (2009), and Ding, Quercia, Reid and White (2010) all associate broker origination with 
higher probabilities of default, with default variously defined as a loan being sixty days delinquent, ninety 
days delinquent, or entering foreclosure or “Real Estate Owned” (REO) status.  These studies all employ 
samples that pool subprime loans with other types of mortgages (loans originated under a Community 
Reinvestment Act special lending program for Ding et al. (2009), prime loans for the others), so their 
findings may not reflect the effects of broker origination specifically on subprime loans.  Alexander et al. 
(2002) finds that subprime loans originated by brokers and loan correspondents are more likely to default 
than retail originations, based on a sample of originations from 1996-1999, well in advance of the recent 
crisis.  Ding, Quercia and White (2010) compare subprime loans originated by brokers with subprime 
loans originated only by national banks and find that broker-originated loans are likelier to default.  That 
study uses a sample of originations from 2002-2006, but follows loan performance only from December 
2006 to December 2008 and so misses a large amount of default and prepayment activity.
14 
Only one previous paper attempts to link the higher probability of default for broker originations 
to differences in the use of a particular loan feature.  Jiang et al. (2009) divides their sample mortgages 
based on origination channel and the level of documentation of borrower information.  They find higher 
delinquency rates for broker-originated loans regardless of the level of documentation. 
A small number of papers examine differences in subprime mortgage interest rates based on 
origination channel, with inconsistent results.  LaCour-Little and Holmes (2008) and El-Anshasy et al. 
(2002) find that broker originations have lower loan rates and lower APRs, respectively.  Elliehausen et 
al. (2008) find that broker originations generally have higher rates, with larger differences for fixed-rate 
mortgages (FRMs) than for hybrid adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs).  Ernst et al. (2008) also find higher 
                                                 
14 The current paper’s sample also includes 2002-2006 subprime originations, but follows loan performance from 
origination through October 2009.  The majorities of all defaults and of all prepayments that appear in the data occur 
within the first two years after origination. 
  7rates for subprime broker originations, but with larger differences for ARMs than for FRMs.  Ernst et al. 
(2008) find no difference in mortgage interest rates based on origination channel for prime loans.  They 
attribute the difference between their prime and subprime results to a greater prevalence of YSPs paid to 
brokers on subprime loans compared to prime loans.  Using a sample of prime mortgages, LaCour-Little 
(2009) finds higher loan rates among broker originations, with lower borrower incomes or credit scores 
associated with larger discrepancies in rates across origination channels. 
  YSPs have been the subject of relatively little empirical investigation due to YSP data being 
generally unavailable.  Jackson and Burlingame (2007) and Woodward and Hall (2010) use data on 
broker originations from 1996-2001 purchased by a single lender to which they had access due to 
discovery in a legal proceeding.  They find that borrowers receive between thirty and forty cents of 
upfront cost reduction for every dollar that brokers receive in YSPs, indicating that the majority of YSPs 
paid to brokers are not passed through to borrowers via reduced fees.  Woodward (2008) uses HUD-1 
settlement statements made available by HUD on a sample of FHA loans from 2001 to analyze total fees 
paid on broker and bank originations.  As noted in Section 1, she finds that borrowers receive greater 
upfront cost reduction per dollar of YSP or overage on bank originations than broker originations, with 
results for non-bank direct lenders varying based on institution size. 
There is a larger existing literature on the relationship between prepayment penalties and loan 
performance, and between prepayment penalties and loan interest rates.  Prepayment penalties could 
increase the probability of default if they lower the cost of default relative to the cost of prepayment for 
financially distressed borrowers, or could decrease the probability of default if loans with prepayment 
penalties carry lower interest rates.  Quercia et al. (2007), Danis and Pennington-Cross (2008), Rose 
(2008), Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2009), and Pennington-Cross and Ho (2010) all find that 
prepayment penalties are associated with greater probabilities of default, although in Rose (2008) and 
Pennington-Cross and Ho (2010) this result is somewhat dependent on the specification and type of loan 
used.  All of the above papers except Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2009) use competing risk models that 
  8jointly consider the probabilities of prepayment and default, and they all find a negative relationship 
between prepayment penalties and the probability of prepayment, as one would expect. 
DeMong and Burroughs (2005) and Ernst (2005) both use single-equation approaches to examine 
the effect of prepayment penalties on loan interest rates.  DeMong and Burroughs (2005) find prepayment 
penalties to be associated with lower interest rates for both FRMs and ARMs, while Ernst (2005), whose 
sample includes only FRMs, finds prepayment penalties to be associated with higher rates for purchase 
FRMs and to have no significant relationship with refinance FRM rates.  Elliehausen et al. (2008) and 
LaCour-Little and Holmes (2008) use multiple-equation approaches controlling for endogeneity among 
loan interest rates, loan-to-value (LTV) ratios and prepayment penalties.  Both find that prepayment 
penalties are associated with lower interest rates, with the reduction being more pronounced for FRMs 
than ARMs.  LaCour-Little and Holmes (2008) also split their sample by origination channel, and find 
that the reduction in loan interest rates associated with a prepayment penalty is greater for broker 
originations.  The results of a theoretical model and empirical analysis by Mayer et al. (2010) suggest that 
the least creditworthy borrowers receive the largest reductions in loan rates associated with prepayment 
penalties. 
The existing literature on the effects of state APL laws on subprime lending mostly focuses on the 
impact of such laws on the volume of subprime lending and on loan interest rates (e.g., see Harvey and 
Nigro, 2003 and 2004; Quercia et al., 2004; Pennington-Cross and Ho, 2006 and 2008; Li and Ernst, 
2007; Bostic et al., 2008).  Ding, Quercia, Reid and White (2010) find that having an APL law in effect is 
associated with a reduction in the probabilities of default and prepayment, and the same holds for certain 
specific provisions of APL laws (those restricting prepayment penalties, requiring verification of 
borrowers’ ability to repay, and covering a broader portion of loans based on their points and fees).  Rose 
(2011) examines a wider variety of APL provisions, and finds they are generally associated with a lower 
probability of default and a higher probability of prepayment.  He also finds APL provisions can alter the 
relationship between prepayment penalties and the probability of default.  Restrictive APL provisions are 
  9frequently associated with prepayment penalties being more positively associated with defaults for FRMs 
and more negatively related for ARMs. 
The present paper makes substantial contributions to the literature on subprime lending and the 
foreclosure crisis.  Foremost, while previous papers have identified a difference in the probability of 
default by origination channel, this is the first paper to link that difference to a specific contract feature, 
the use of prepayment penalties.  It is also the first to examine how variations in the use of prepayment 
penalties are consistent with differences in compensation incentives by origination channel.  It does so 
using a sample comprised solely of subprime loans from the mid-2000s, therefore focusing attention on 
the mortgage market segment most associated with the onset of the recent downturn.  With respect to the 
relationship between prepayment penalties and loan interest rates, it is the only paper to examine that 
relationship using the fully-indexed rates for ARMs, and so is the first to identify that although an ARM 
borrower who accepts a prepayment penalty may receive a lower initial rate, the rate he or she pays after 
adjustment to the fully-indexed rate is likely to be higher regardless of origination channel.  Finally, this 
paper tests how specific state APL law provisions affect subprime loan performance by origination 
channel, and presents evidence indicating that where the provisions are in effect, non-bank originations do 
not have a higher probability of default than bank originations. 
 
3. Hypotheses 
  This paper tests several hypotheses concerning origination channel, prepayment penalties, and 
default risk, based on the compensation incentives associated with YSPs and overages.  For convenience, 
below I use the term YSPs to encompass both YSPs and overages.  The hypotheses are described below: 
H1:  Non-bank origination is more positively associated with the probability of default for loans 
with prepayment penalties than for loans without prepayment penalties.  The crux of H1 is that a loan 
having a prepayment penalty can be taken as an indicator of compensation incentives via YSPs to place 
the borrower in a higher interest rate loan, and that those incentives are on average stronger for non-bank 
  10originators than for bank originators.  All else equal, higher interest rate loans should have a higher 
probability of default. 
Suppose that for brokers YSPs (either the amount or whether they are paid at all) are conditional 
on loans having prepayment penalties, but YSPs are not (or are not as often) conditional on prepayment 
penalties for direct lender loan officers.  Among prepayment penalty loans, YSP compensation would be 
more prevalent for non-bank originations than for bank originations.  If YSPs provide an incentive for 
originators to place borrowers in higher interest rate loans, and all else equal higher interest rate loans are 
associated with greater default risk, then non-bank originations would have a higher probability of default 
than bank originations for prepayment penalty loans.  By the same token, among loans without 
prepayment penalties, YSP compensation would be less prevalent for non-bank originations than for bank 
originations, and so non-bank originations would have a lower probability of default than bank 
originations.  Suppose instead that YSPs are similarly conditional on prepayment penalties for brokers 
and loan officers, but that on average YSPs provide greater incentives for non-bank originators than bank-
originators to place borrowers in higher rate loans.
15  In this case, non-bank origination would still be 
positively associated with the probability of default for loans with prepayment penalties because YSP 
compensation would provide relatively greater incentives to non-bank originators than bank originators.  
Among loans without prepayment penalties, there would be little compensation via YSPs regardless of 
originator channel, and so little reason to expect a significant relationship between non-bank origination 
and the probability of default. 
Note that if there are no differences across origination channels in either the link between 
prepayment penalties and YSPs or the incentive YSPs provide to place borrowers in higher interest rate 
loans, then H1 is not expected to hold.  Note also that H1 does not depend on a prepayment penalty being 
in effect in a given month.  Instead, a loan being originated with a prepayment penalty is taken as a proxy 
                                                 
15 As discussed in Section 1, this could be because of prohibitions or restrictions on loan officer YSPs by some 
direct lenders, YSPs forming a smaller part of total compensation for loan officers than for brokers, or differences 
by origination channel in the percentage of YSPs passed through to borrowers. 
  11for compensation incentives provided by YSPs, which could affect loan terms beyond the expiration of 
the prepayment penalty. 
H2:  Non-banks price prepayment penalties less favorably for borrowers than banks do.  In 
general, a borrower faced with two otherwise identical loans, one of which features a prepayment penalty 
while the other does not, will receive a lower interest rate on the loan with the prepayment penalty 
because the lender faces less prepayment risk.  For originators motivated by YSP compensation, this 
discount for a prepayment penalty is likely to be mitigated by the incentive to increase the interest rate.  
Due to differing compensation structures, non-bank originators will have a stronger incentive than bank 
originators to increase the interest rate on prepayment penalty loans. 
H3:  Relative to banks, non-banks originate disproportionately more loans with prepayment 
penalties to borrowers who are less financially sophisticated or more financially constrained.  Less 
financially sophisticated borrowers are more prone to accept expensive loans despite qualifying for 
cheaper loans because such borrowers are less likely to (1) be aware that they qualify for cheaper loans, 
(2) be aware of the importance of comparison shopping among originators for better loan rates, or (3) 
understand the implications of their loan terms, including prepayment penalties.  In addition, a financially 
constrained borrower may be more likely to accept the terms given by a particular originator rather than 
shop around if the borrower is unable to pay the high application fees that subprime borrowers often 
face.
16  Non-bank originators, who face a stronger compensation incentive to place borrowers in 
expensive loans with prepayment penalties, are likely to originate disproportionately more prepayment 
penalty loans to those types of borrowers. 
H4:  The origination channel effect described in H1 is weaker in the presence of state APL 
restrictions on the use of prepayment penalties.  H1 relies on YSP compensation being a driving factor 
behind less affordable loans and greater default risk, and it relies on the availability or amount of YSP 
compensation being conditional on loans having prepayment penalties.  If those are correct, then 
                                                 
16 McCoy (2007) describes how, unlike prime borrowers, subprime borrowers must often pay substantial application 
and appraisal fees to originators prior to learning the actual price of a mortgage, potentially making comparison 
shopping prohibitively expensive. 
  12limitations on the use of prepayment penalties imply limitations on the willingness of purchasing 
institutions and direct lenders to offer YSPs.  This further implies less incentive for originators to place 
borrowers in higher rate loans.  Restrictions on the use of prepayment penalties therefore should weaken 




4.  Data and Methodology 
  This paper uses the LoanPerformance dataset from CoreLogic, Inc., which consists of monthly 
loan-level data on purchase and refinance mortgages for single family residences originated during 2002-
2006 and followed through October 2009.
18  These are loans that have been packaged into subprime-
grade private-label mortgage-backed securities.  In-depth analysis of state APL provisions in all fifty 
states is beyond the scope of this paper.  Therefore the data covers ten MSAs, listed in Table 1.  The 
selection of these MSAs was based on a report from RealtyTrac, Inc. (2007), providing 2007 foreclosure 
rates for the hundred largest metropolitan areas in the United States.  To ensure that the sample MSAs 
represent both a substantial number of American households and a diverse range of mortgage market 
difficulties, I divided the MSAs with populations over one million inhabitants into deciles based on the 
reported foreclosure rates.  From each decile I selected the MSA with the highest population, with the 
condition that only one MSA from any state be included to ensure geographic diversity.
19  To make the 
                                                 
17 If originators respond to a reduction in YSP income due to APL law restrictions on prepayment penalties by 
raising the fees paid upfront by borrowers, then the overall relative costs of bank versus non-bank loans could 
remain unchanged, and so the association between non-bank origination and default risk might not change due to 
APL laws.  Chari and Jagannathan (1989) argue that upfront points are effectively a form of prepayment penalty. 
18 Mayer and Pence (2009) compare the LoanPerformance data’s coverage of subprime origination to the coverage 
of two other sources, loans originated by lenders appearing on the list of subprime lenders maintained by HUD and 
higher-priced loans identified since 2004 in data collected under the auspices of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act.  
The authors conclude that during the mid-2000s, the LoanPerformance data likely provide the most reliable 
coverage of subprime originations. 
19 Population figures are from the July 1, 2007 estimates of the U.S. Census Bureau.  The highest population MSA 
from each decile included two California MSAs (Los Angeles and Riverside) and two MSAs covering parts of New 
Jersey (New York City and Newark).  In each case, the lower-population MSA (Riverside and Newark) were 
replaced by the next most populous MSA in that decile (Miami and San Antonio, respectively). 
  13analyses computationally more tractable, I randomly select 25 percent of loans for specifications 
(described below) using a loan-month as the unit of observation.  For loan-level analyses, I use all loans. 
To simplify the construction of ARM-specific variables, the sample ARMs are limited to 30-year 
loans for which the interest rates adjust every six months, the first scheduled rate adjustments occur in the 
twenty-fourth or thirty-sixth month, and the interest rates are indexed to the six-month London Interbank 
Offered Rate (LIBOR).  Those loans represent over 96 percent of the total ARM sample.  FRMs are 
limited to loans with terms of fifteen or thirty years, representing over 94 percent of the total FRM 
sample, to ensure that FRM-specific variables are constructed using market FRM rates of the appropriate 
maturities.  Balloon and interest-only loans are excluded.   
  The LoanPerformance data contains loan-level information including loan type (FRM or ARM), 
purpose (purchase or refinance), origination date, dates when a loan is prepaid or a foreclosure process is 
initiated, the loan interest rate, LTV ratio, and borrower FICO score at origination, whether the borrower 
withdrew cash out (for refinances), whether the loan was based on low- or no-documentation, and the 
length of the prepayment penalty period (if any).  This data was merged with quarterly MSA-level home 
price index values from Freddie Mac’s conventional mortgage home price index, monthly MSA-level 
unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, monthly FRM and ARM interest rates from 
Freddie Mac’s Primary Mortgage Market Survey, monthly bank prime interest rates from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Saint Louis, ZIP-code level demographic information from the 2000 Census, 
information on state foreclosure laws from Ghent and Kudlyak (2010), and information on state APL laws 
assembled by the author.
20  Loans are divided into four categories by loan type and purpose. 
                                                 
20 An alternative to the Freddie Mac conventional mortgage home price index, the Case-Shiller monthly MSA-level 
home price index, is available for seven of the ten sample MSAs (it is unavailable for Baltimore, Pittsburgh, and San 
Antonio).  All of the analyses presented in this paper that make use of CLTV and VarHPI were also run using the 
Case-Shiller index values to calculate those variables.  The pattern of results holds, albeit with reduction in statistical 
significance in several incidences.  That is plausibly related to the sample size reduction caused by excluding three 
of the MSAs.  To examine that, the analyses were run again with the same seven MSAs and using original values of 
CLTV and VarHPI based on the Freddie Mac index values.  The results for the seven MSAs based on different home 
price indices are extremely similar.  These results are available from the author. 
  14To determine the primary supervisory agency for each originator, originator names in the 
LoanPerformance data were matched to respondent institution names in the annual HMDA transmittal 
sheets.  In LoanPerformance, originator name is a hand-entered field filled by LoanPerformance’s data 
sources, and so frequently includes abbreviations, truncations, and typos, or is left blank.  Two matching 
approaches were used, an algorithmic one employing a few simple standardizations (e.g., removing 
punctuation, converting names to all caps) and manual inspection of the lists of LoanPerformance and 
HMDA names.  The algorithmic approach was successful in only a minority of cases, so most matches 
were accomplished manually.  If an algorithmic match differed from a match based on manual inspection, 
the manual inspection match, which allowed for analytical judgment, was used. 
Once an originator was matched to a HMDA respondent, the transmittal sheet data on each 
lender’s primary supervisory agency was used to classify the originator as being either a depository 
institution (“bank”) or not (“non-bank”).
21  This is a different categorization than is often used in 
examinations of origination channel and default, which typically rely on a dataset from Lender Processing 
Services, Inc. (LPS).
22  The LPS dataset includes a field denoting whether a loan was originated by a 
retail, wholesale, or correspondent originator, but the dataset does not provide extensive coverage of the 
subprime market in the years leading up to the recent financial coverage.  Additionally, the LPS product 
to which I have access (the Loss Mitigation Loan Level Data Collection product) does not include 
information on whether a loan features a prepayment penalty, rendering it of little use in testing this 
paper’s hypotheses.  LoanPerformance has the appropriate subprime coverage and the necessary data on 
prepayment penalties to test the hypotheses, but requires the categorization used here. 
                                                 
21 Specifically, banks are defined as originators for which the primary supervisory agency identified by the HMDA 
transmittal sheet agency code variable is the Federal Reserve, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of Thrift Supervision, or National Credit Union Association.  Non-banks are 
defined as originators for which the agency code variable indicates that the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development is the primary supervisory agency.  Following the HMDA agency code designations, mortgage 
lending subsidiaries of depository institutions and lenders that own depository institutions are classified as banks. 
22 Some papers make use of proprietary data assembled by one or more lending institutions and made available by 
private arrangement or license.  Such datasets can be quite rich, but are generally inaccessible to other researchers, 
including this one. 
  15The originator could not be identified in approximately 30 percent of sample loans, requiring that 
those loans be dropped.  Dropping so many loans could plausibly introduce bias, so several characteristics 
of loans with known versus unknown originators are reported in Table 2.  For most loan categories, there 
are few sizable differences, but purchase FRMs are the exception.  The originator of noticeably fewer 
purchase FRMs could be identified (60 percent) than loans in the other categories (69-72 percent).  For 
several variables (percentages of loans with prepayment penalties or for owner-occupied properties, LTV 
ratio, FICO scores), the discrepancy between values for loans with known versus unknown originators is 
substantially larger for purchase FRMs than for the other three categories.  For the percentage of loans 
with prepayment penalties, the discrepancy is seven times larger for purchase FRMs than for any other 
category.  This is particularly troublesome given that the hypotheses of this paper all revolve around 
prepayment penalties.  For this reason, purchase FRMs are dropped from the analyses. 
Variables used in this paper are defined in Table 3, with means presented in Table 4.  Starting 
with the variables used in the loan outcome analyses, NonBank, the key variable of interest, indicates a 
loan not originated by a depository institution primarily supervised by one of the federal financial 
regulatory agencies.  PrepayPen indicates whether a prepayment penalty is in effect for a loan in a given 
month, and PrepayPenEnd indicates loans in the month that a prepayment penalty period ends and the 
two following months.  If prepayment penalties are binding constraints on prepayment, one would expect 
the probability of prepayment to increase sharply but temporarily immediately after the penalty period 
ends.  LowNoDoc indicates loans that were originated based on reduced documentation, which fosters 
ambiguity in a borrower’s ability to repay a loan.  This can be used to place a borrower into more 
expensive loan than the borrower can afford, and so is expected to be positively associated with default.  
Cashout indicates refinancings in which borrowers extract or “cash out” some of their equity.  The 
  16relationship between it and prepayment is expected to be positive, as borrowers with the demonstrated 
willingness to extract equity once are plausibly more likely to refinance again.
23 
FICO measures the borrower’s credit score at origination, which should be negatively related to 
default.  CLTV is an estimate of the borrower’s equity in the home in the current month.  Low or negative 
equity (implying a high value of CLTV) is expected to increase the probability of default as the option to 
default is more valuable to the borrower, while greater equity (lower CLTV) should increase the 
probability of prepayment as borrowers with significant equity find it easier to refinance their loans and 
can cash out equity.
24  RelLoanSize is included on the premise that loan size may be correlated to 
borrower income or wealth, and so can indicate protection against financial distress.  RelLoanSize is 
expected to be negatively related to default and positively related to prepayment (as qualifying for a 
refinancing becomes more likely).  ChgUnempl proxies for the likelihood of an event causing financial 
distress, and so is expected to be positively related to default and negatively related to prepayment.  
VarHPI captures volatility in house prices, with option theory suggesting that greater volatility makes 
borrowers likely to delay defaulting in case the option to default becomes more valuable.  Judicial 
indicates whether state law requires lenders to go through a judicial foreclosure process rather than a 
quicker non-judicial process, and so Judicial should be associated with a lesser probability of default.  All 
specifications also include origination year and MSA indicator variables. 
Three ZIP code level variables from the 2000 Census are used as (admittedly rough) proxies for 
borrowers’ financial sophistication or financial constraints.  College is the percentage of residents in a 
borrower’s ZIP code that have a Bachelor’s degree or higher level of education.  MedianIncome is the 
median household income in a borrower’s ZIP code.  MedianAge is the median resident age in a 
borrower’s ZIP code.  All three are plausibly related to an understanding of and experience with financial 
                                                 
23 Table 4 indicates that cashout refinance loans are the great majority of refinance ARMs and FRMs.  As a 
robustness check, all of the analyses on refinance loans reported in this paper were also performed on only cashout 
refinances.  Results were similar throughout, and are available from the author. 
24 It should be noted that in the LoanPerformance data one cannot reliably link first and subordinate liens on the 
same property, so the variables CLTV and LTV do not reflect the effect of subordinate liens on borrower equity. 
  17decision-making and to wealth, and all three are highly correlated, so no attempt is made here to relate 
any of them exclusively to either financial sophistication or financial constraints.
25 
ARM-specific variables are based on those used by Ambrose et al. (2005) and Pennington-Cross 
and Ho (2010).  PaymentAdj measures the increase in monthly payment at a loan’s most recent rate reset, 
and should be positively associated with defaults and prepayments.
26  Adj1st indicates the month of a 
loan’s first scheduled rate reset and the following two months, with the expectation that there should be a 
spike in defaults and prepayments during that window.  PostAdj1st indicates all months following the 
Adj1st window to distinguish this period from the months before the first scheduled rate reset.  Spread 
uses the spread between the current market FRM and ARM rates to proxy for the potential benefit to a 
borrower of refinancing into a FRM, and as such should be negatively related to prepayments.  VarLIBOR 
captures the volatility of the LIBOR, with option theory suggesting that greater volatility makes 
borrowers likely to delay prepaying in case the option to refinance becomes more valuable in the future.  
In FRM specifications, RefiPremium has a purpose analogous to Spread, using the spread between the 
loan interest rate and the current market FRM rate, divided by the loan interest rate, as a proxy for the 
potential benefit to the borrower of refinancing.  VarFixed is the FRM analogue to VarLIBOR. 
The specifications that examine the pricing of prepayment penalties utilize some of the above 
variables and some additional ones.  PrepayLoan indicates a loan that has a prepayment penalty (of any 
duration) at origination.  LTV is the borrower’s loan-to-value ratio at origination.  InitialRate is the initial 
loan interest rate.  For ARMs, the initial rate may be substantially below the rate to which the loan will 
adjust over time, so I use Margin to reflect loan price.  OwnerOcc indicates a loan associated with an 
                                                 
25 Depending on the loan category and the pair of variables used, the bilateral correlations among College, 
MedianIncome, and MedianAge range from 0.37 to 0.77. 
26 As in Pennington-Cross and Ho (2010), PaymentAdj is constrained to be non-negative and equals zero prior to a 
loan’s first scheduled rate reset.  When I replace PaymentAdj with a similar variable without those constraints, that 
variable is positively related to the probability of default but negatively related to the probability of prepayment.  
This might be due to the introduction into the variable of loan modifications, the likeliest source of reductions in 
monthly payments prior to a loan’s first scheduled rate reset.  A loan modification may be a temporary step until a 
distressed borrower can either refinance into a more affordable mortgage or sell his or her house, suggesting a 
positive relationship between loan modifications and prepayments.  Replacing PaymentAdj with the altered variable 
noticeably changes the magnitudes of Adj1st, PostAdj1st and Spread in the prepayment equation results, but other 
variables are largely unaffected. 
  18owner-occupied property.  Multiple indicator variables represent the distributions of resident ages and 
house values in a borrower’s ZIP code.  %Refinance and %ShortTenure are used as proxies for the 
amount of turnover in a given real estate market, which may be negatively associated with the demand for 
loans with prepayment penalties.  APL_Duration and APL_Amount indicate state APL law provisions that 
restrict the use of prepayment penalties beyond the restrictions in effect nationwide under the federal 
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA).  (The appendix provides additional detail on these 
variables.)  PrimeRate is the monthly bank prime loan rate.  3/27ARM indicates an ARM in which the 
first rate adjustment occurs three years (rather than two) after origination, while 30YearFRM indicates a 
FRM with a 30-year (rather than 15-year) term. 
  The loan outcome analyses employ multinomial logit (MNL) models with the data structured in 
event history format, with each observation representing one month in which a loan remains active.  In 
each month, a loan remains active, is prepaid, or defaults, with default defined as a loan first entering 
foreclosure.
27  A loan drops out of the sample after a first foreclosure start or prepayment.  The model 
directly controls for the competing risks of default and prepayment by requiring that the probabilities of 
all three outcomes sum to one.  Clapp et al. (2006) develop a MNL model that incorporates unobserved 
heterogeneity by modeling individual borrowers as coming from a finite number of discrete groups with 
unobserved characteristics.  That model is econometrically preferable to the standard model, which 
assumes there is no unobserved heterogeneity across observations, but the model incorporating 
unobserved heterogeneity is vastly more time intensive and more prone to convergence problems.  In 
unreported regressions using a MNL model with unobserved heterogeneity, only about half converged 
after several hundred iterations, but the results of those that did are qualitatively similar to the results 
using the standard MNL model presented below.  These specifications employ standard errors clustered 
                                                 
27 In 115 (0.08 percent) of the sample loans, LoanPerformance data provides a date for the loans entering REO status 
with no preceding foreclosure start date.  In what follows, I treat the REO start dates for those loans as first 
foreclosure start dates.  Excluding those loans from the analyses causes no substantive changes to the results. 
  19by both month and loan.
28  The MNL model also assumes that the odds ratio between any two outcomes 
is independent of any other possible outcomes.  An alternative, the proportional hazard model, estimates 
the effects of explanatory variables on survival times without requiring assumptions about the underlying 
hazard function, but does assume that given two observations with different explanatory variable values, 
the ratio of the observations’ hazard functions does not depend on time.  As a robustness check, the MNL 
analyses were also performed using a proportional hazard model, with similar results.
29 
  The analysis of the pricing of prepayment penalties is similar to Elliehausen et al. (2008) and 
LaCour-Little and Holmes (2008), who use instrumental variable approaches to address the endogeneity 
of loan interest rates, LTV ratios, and prepayment penalties.  This approach is applied here to all loans, 
only bank-originated loans, and only non-bank-originated loans to examine how the impact of 
prepayment penalties on loan prices differs by origination channel.  These specifications use loan-level 
data and employ standard errors clustered by loan. 
 
5. Empirical  Analysis 
5.1  Testing Hypothesis 1 
  Table 5 presents results of MNL regressions of the probabilities of default and prepayment.  For 
each loan category, the first column represents results based on all loans, the second column is based only 
on loans that have prepayment penalties, and the third column is based only on loans without prepayment 
                                                 
28 See Petersen (2009) for a discussion of different approaches to clustering standard errors and the availability of 
code for clustering on two dimensions in various statistical software packages. 
29 Some researchers use a proportional hazard model that controls for unobserved heterogeneity to examine 
competing mortgage risks (see Deng et al., 2000; Clapp et al., 2006; Pennington-Cross and Ho, 2010).  Like its 
MNL counterpart, the proportional hazard model with unobserved heterogeneity is highly time intensive.  Gerardi et 
al. (2009) eschew incorporating unobserved heterogeneity into their proportional hazard model for their full samples 
specifically due to it being “extremely computationally burdensome,” and find no substantial differences in their 
results when they did so for very small subsets of their data (see their footnote 9).  Given this, I do not use such a 
model here.  Clapp et al. (2006) use mortgage termination data to compare results using a standard MNL model, a 
MNL model with unobserved heterogeneity, a standard proportional hazard model, and a proportional hazard model 
with unobserved heterogeneity.  They find similar results across all four models. 
  20penalties.
30  For both purchase ARMs and refinance ARMs, NonBank is positively related to the 
probability of default for prepayment penalty loans, with non-bank origination associated with a 6.5-9.4 
percent increase in the probability of default.
31  For loans without prepayment penalties, NonBank is not 
statistically significant, indicating that the higher probability of default associated with non-bank 
origination is confined to loans with prepayment penalties.  The same pattern is visible in the magnitudes 
of the coefficient estimates of NonBank for refinance FRMs, although the estimate for prepayment 
penalty loans is just short of statistical significance at conventional levels (p = 0.102).  These results are 
consistent with H1.  With regard to the probability of prepayment, NonBank is positively associated with 
prepayment for refinance ARMs and refinance FRMs regardless of prepayment penalties.  Non-bank 
origination is only related to the probability of prepayment for purchase ARMs without prepayment 
penalties. 
  PrepayPen is associated with an 8-15 percent reduction in the probability of default, suggesting 
that on net the reduction in default risk due to lower interest rates on prepayment penalty loans outweighs 
the increase in default risk due to prepayment penalties raising the cost of prepayment relative to the cost 
of default.  This contrasts with previous studies, which generally find prepayment penalties to be 
positively associated with default (see Section 2).  This apparent discrepancy may be due to sample 
period differences.  Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2009) find that subprime loan quality deteriorated in the 
years leading up to the mortgage crisis, and my sample includes more loans from those years than the 
samples of the previous studies.  Given the theoretical and empirical result of Mayer et al. (2010) that the 
benefits of prepayment penalties are greatest for the riskiest borrowers, it may not be surprising that 
prepayment penalties are negatively related to default in my sample. 
                                                 
30 In all multinomial logit regressions in these and subsequent tables, for the “Prepays only” subsamples I also 
estimated the regressions with PrepayPen and PrepayPenEnd included.  In no case were the coefficient estimates 
for the other variables substantively altered. 
31 For a given coefficient estimate β, the percentage change in the probability of default or prepayment, relative to 
the probability of a loan remaining active, associated with a one-unit change in the explanatory variable is calculated 
as e
β – 1.  For example, the 0.0894 shown for NonBank in the second column of Table 5 implies a relative change in 
the probability of a default of e
(0.0894) – 1 = 0.0935, a 9.4 percent increase. 
  21Most results for the other control variables are in line with expectations, with a few exceptions.  
Adj1st is negatively associated with defaults, indicating that defaults are more likely to be initiated prior 
to the first rate reset than immediately after.  RelLoanSize is positively related to defaults, suggesting that 
instead of proxying for borrower wealth, the variable may capture loans that are large relative to 
borrowers’ incomes.  VarHPI is positively related to prepayments, which is consistent with most of the 
variation in house price indices during the sample period being driven by rapidly rising house prices.  
ChgUnempl is negatively related to defaults for ARMs, but not refinance FRMs.  If rising unemployment 
coincides with stable or falling interest rates, then the potential negative income shock of losing a job may 
be outweighed for many borrowers by smaller payment shocks due to mortgage rate adjustments.  FICO 
is positively related to prepayments for purchase ARMs but negatively related for refinances.  This may 
indicate that purchase borrowers are more likely to refinance due to improving circumstances (e.g., ability 
to qualify for a lower-cost loan) while refinance borrowers are more likely to borrow under difficult 
circumstances (e.g., inability to afford payments on their current loans). 
  The results of Table 5 indicate that the relationship between origination channel and the 
probability of default varies substantially depending on whether a loan does or does not feature a 
prepayment penalty, and that the variation is similar across loan categories.  H1 posits that the variation is 
due to differences in compensation incentives related to prepayment penalties, but other explanations are 
possible.  For instance, prepayment penalties may be correlated with less borrower financial 
sophistication, or with a borrower being financially constrained such that the only way the borrower can 
get a loan interest rate he or she can afford is by accepting a prepayment penalty.  Financial constraints 
and a lack of financial sophistication are quite plausibly correlated with the probability of default.
32  If the 
relationships between financial sophistication or constraints and default are stronger for borrowers who 
use non-bank originators than for those who use bank originators, then that would be consistent with the 
                                                 
32 In unreported regressions otherwise identical to those in Table 5, I included College, MedianIncome, and 
MedianAge, individually and together.  Each of the three variables is negatively and significantly related to the 
probability of default in most specifications.  Inclusion of those variables only trivially changes the coefficient 
estimates for NonBank, PrepayPen, and PrepayPenEnd.  These results are available from the author. 
  22results for NonBank in Table 5.  Another possible explanation is that prepayment penalties could simply 
represent an additional risk factor that exacerbates default risk particularly for the less creditworthy 
borrowers who use non-bank originators. 
  To test these alternative explanations, Table 6 presents the coefficient estimates of NonBank from 
specifications similar to those in Table 5, but instead of splitting the sample based on prepayment 
penalties it is split in turn by several other variables indicative of potential risk factors (LowNoDoc, 
RelLoanSize, LTV, and FICO) or borrower financial sophistication or financial constraints (College, 
MedianIncome, and MedianAge).
33  There are only minor differences in the significance of NonBank with 
respect to the probability of default across the first three sample splits.  For the samples split by borrower 
FICO score, there are differences in significance, but they are not consistent across loan categories.
34  The 
results for College, MedianIncome, and MedianAge are highly consistent with each other (see footnote 
25), but as with FICO the differences in significance are not consistent across loan categories.  In no case 
does the pattern of results for NonBank resemble the pattern found in Table 5.  This strongly suggests that 
results for NonBank in the sample split by prepayment penalties in Table 5 are not capturing an 
origination channel effect based on an additional loan risk factor or on borrower financial sophistication 
or constraints.  The possibility remains that the Table 5 results reflect greater default risk among 
borrowers who use non-bank originators based on some margin that is related to prepayment penalties but 
unrelated to the variables used in Table 6, but precisely what that margin would be is rather unclear.
35  
The compensation incentive argument behind H1 appears likelier to be the correct interpretation. 
                                                 
33 Results for other variables are similar to those reported in Table 5, and are omitted here for brevity.  Complete 
results are available from the author. 
34 The results based on splitting the sample by FICO score may be clouded by the fact that borrowers with high 
FICO scores should be less likely to have a subprime loan rather than a prime loan.  In unreported regressions 
available from the author, excluding loans to borrowers with high FICO scores (above 720 or 660) results in point 
estimates for NonBank that are closer across subsamples and with weaker statistical significance than those shown in 
Table 6. 
35 Information about a borrower’s prepayment risk at first would seem to be the likeliest candidate, but when an 
institution purchases a loan from a broker, the purchasing institution bears the prepayment risk and collects any 
prepayment penalty, not the broker.  For this reason, non-bank originators should be less, not more, likely than bank 
originators to act on information regarding prepayment risk.  For discussion and evidence on third-party mortgage 
origination and prepayment risk, see LaCour-Little and Chun (1999). 
  23  In the later years of the observation period following the onset of the foreclosure crisis, increasing 
numbers of loan modifications occurred in attempts to prevent borrowers from entering foreclosure.  If 
bank-originated loans were more likely than non-bank-originated loans to be modified (perhaps due to 
government pressure on federally-supervised lenders), and this greater proclivity to modify were more 
pronounced for loans with prepayment penalties, that could produce the pattern of results for NonBank in 
the default equations in Table 5.  Non-bank originations with prepayment penalties would have a greater 
probability of default not because borrowers of those loans were more likely to have difficulty making 
their payments, but because they were less likely to receive loan modifications that could stave off the 
start of a foreclosure process.  To examine this possibility, I performed the analyses from Table 5 with the 
definition of default altered to include loans that become 90 days delinquent so that the recording of a 
default is not dependent on the decision of a loan servicer.  Results (available from the author) are similar 
to those in Table 5, but with some noteworthy differences.  For purchase ARMs without prepayment 
penalties, NonBank crosses the threshold for significance at the 10 percent level, weakening the support 
for H1.  NonBank is negatively significant at the 10 percent level for refinance ARMs without 
prepayment penalties and is positively significant at the 1 percent level for refinance FRMs with 
prepayment penalties, both results strengthening the support for H1. 
 
5.2  Testing Hypothesis 2 
To evaluate the hypothesis that non-banks price prepayment penalties less favorably for 
borrowers than banks do, Tables 7a-7c present results of regressions examining the role of prepayment 
penalties in the determination of loan interest rates while controlling for the endogeneity among loan 
rates, LTV ratios, and prepayment penalties.  In deciding on the terms of a loan, borrowers are frequently 
offered a variety of interest rate and LTV ratio combinations (higher rates associated with higher LTV 
ratios), with a discrete reduction in interest rate available in exchange for accepting a prepayment penalty.  
For this reason, single-equation regressions of loan interest rates on determinants including LTV and 
prepayment penalties may produce biased coefficient estimates.  I address this endogeneity by using an 
  24equation-by-equation two stage least squares (2SLS) model for estimating loan interest rate and LTV and 
a probit model with instrumental variables (IV) for estimating PrepayLoan.  An alternative approach to 
equation-by-equation 2SLS is a simultaneous equation model, which is more efficient if all equations are 
specified correctly.  However, misspecification in one equation of a simultaneous equation system can 
cause inconsistent coefficient estimates in the entire system, while in an equation-by-equation approach 
this problem is confined to the equation in which the misspecification exists.  Given that the 
LoanPerformance data has little information regarding borrower characteristics that may be used in 
determining loan interest rates, concern about misspecification argues for the more robust equation-by-
equation model. 
In each of Tables 7a-7c (one table for each loan category), the first three columns present results 
from the loan interest rate regressions using all loans, only bank-originated loans, and only non-bank-
originated loans, respectively.  For refinance FRMs, the loan interest rate measure is InitialRate.
36  The 
initial interest rate of an ARM is not the most appropriate measure of the ARM’s price because the initial 
rate is often substantially below the fully-indexed rate, so for ARMs the loan interest rate measure is 
Margin.
37  The next three columns show results from the LTV regressions, and the final three columns 
show results of the PrepayLoan regressions.  To implement the 2SLS model, for each subsample of loans 
a simple probit regression was run to generate the predicted probability that a loan has a prepayment 
penalty.
38  Those values and LTV appear in the loan interest rate regressions.  Either Margin or InitialRate 
is included in both the LTV and PrepayLoan regressions.  Given the decision structure described above 
                                                 
36 Ideally, the loan interest rate would be adjusted to reflect prevailing market subprime mortgage rates at the time of 
origination, but to my knowledge no index of subprime market rates is available.  Instead, I performed the analyses 
of this section again using InitialRate minus the Freddie Mac prime mortgage market survey rate for the loan 
origination month.  I also performed the analyses using InitialRate minus the median value of InitialRate from all 
sample loans in the same loan category originated in the same month.  In both cases, the results were similar to those 
reported in this section. 
37 Elliehausen et al. (2008) and DeMong and Burroughs (2005) use APR as their loan interest rate measure (adjusted 
by a market rate at the time of origination, for Elliehausen et al., 2008).  Although this captures the interest expected 
to be paid over the life of an ARM, it does not allow for the possibility of different effects of prepayment penalties 
on initial rates and fully-indexed rates.  Unreported results using InitialRate for ARMs are discussed briefly below. 
38 Independent variables for the probit regressions are the same as those in Panel C of Tables 7a-7c, excluding 
Margin and InitialRate.  Results of these regressions are available from the author. 
  25(selection of an interest rate-LTV combination, then consideration of a prepayment penalty), LTV and 
PrepayLoan need not be determined simultaneously, and so do not appear in each other’s regressions. 
Several loan characteristics are among the explanatory variables in all equations, but each 
equation also contains instruments associated with the dependent variable.  The instrument in the loan 
interest rate equation is the bank prime rate.  This rate is mainly used to price business loans, and may be 
taken as a measure of the opportunity cost of mortgage lending.  The prime rate does not frequently 
change in response to other market rates, and so should not have a direct bearing on borrowers’ choices 
regarding loan terms.  In the LTV equations, indicator variables that measure the age distribution of 
residents in the borrower’s ZIP code are used as instruments because older borrowers tend to have more 
wealth than younger ones, and so may prefer loans with lower LTV ratios.  The distribution of house 
values in the borrower’s ZIP code are used on a similar premise, that borrowers with greater wealth are 
likely to choose higher-value properties.  In the PrepayLoan equations, the unique variables include 
%Refinance, %ShortTenure, and APL_Duration.  More refinancing activity and more residents who have 
lived in their homes for a short time may indicate greater turnover in local home ownership, which could 
affect borrowers’ expectations of how long they will be in a particular house and therefore their 
preferences regarding prepayment penalties.  An APL provision restricting the duration of prepayment 
penalty periods limits the reduction of the lender’s prepayment risk that a prepayment penalty offers, and 
so can make prepayment penalties less attractive to lenders and more attractive to borrowers.
39 
The main variable of interest is Pr(PrepayLoan), the predicted probability that a loan will have a 
prepayment penalty.  The coefficient estimates for Pr(PrepayLoan) do not directly indicate the change in 
loan interest rate associated with a prepayment penalty.  Those changes are calculated in Table 8 by 
multiplying each coefficient estimate for Pr(PrepayLoan) by the difference in the average 
                                                 
39 In unreported regressions, I replaced APL_Duration with APL_Amount.  The two are highly correlated, with 
correlation coefficients ranging from 0.54 to 0.72, depending on the loan category.  Results using APL_Amount were 
similar to those in Tables 7a-7c, the main difference being that the coefficient estimates on Pr(PrepayLoan) drop in 
significance in a few instances.  To ensure that potential differences in the durations of prepayment penalty periods 
offered by non-banks and banks do not distort the reported results, I also ran the regressions using only loans 
without prepayment penalties and loans with prepayment penalty periods equal to the most common duration for the 
loan type (24 months for ARMs, 36 months for FRMs).  Again, the results were similar. 
  26Pr(PrepayLoan) for loans with versus without prepayment penalties.  The results in Panel A indicate that 
for ARMs, accepting a prepayment penalty is associated with an increase in Margin, and that the increase 
is substantially greater for non-bank originations (56-94 basis points) than for bank originations (18-24 
basis points).  This is consistent with H2.  In unreported regressions that are available upon request, I used 
InitialRate instead of Margin for ARMs.  For refinance ARMs, prepayment penalties are associated with 
a 14 basis point reduction in initial loan rate for bank originations and a 21 basis point reduction for non-
bank originations.  For purchase ARMs, prepayment penalties are associated with a 7 basis point increase 
in initial loan rate for both origination channels.  Note that the magnitudes of the increases in Margin in 
Panel A of Table 8 exceed the reductions, if any, in InitialRate.  For ARM borrowers who retain their 
loans beyond the first rate reset, savings they may have gained through a discount on their introductory 
interest rate in exchange for accepting a prepayment penalty may be reduced or lost entirely through 
subsequently higher rates.  This is especially true for non-bank originations, for which the increase in 
Margin is three to four times as large as it is for bank originations. 
Panel B of Table 8 indicates that for refinance FRMs, prepayment penalties are association with a 
34 basis point reduction in loan interest rate.  This magnitude is consistent with Elliehausen et al. (2008) 
and somewhat larger than that found by LaCour-Little and Holmes (2008).  Bank originators appear to 
provide discounts on loan rates for prepayment penalties that are almost 25 basis points greater than the 
discounts provided by non-bank originators, consistent with H2.  A caveat should be noted here.  As is the 
case in many mortgage databases, data on upfront costs, such as points and fees, is unavailable in 
LoanPerformance.  Therefore an investigation of the effect of prepayment penalties on the total cost of a 
loan across origination channels is not possible here.  In addition, this paper is the first examination of 
how ARM margins are affected by prepayment penalties, and the topic must be explored more deeply for 
a complete understanding of the full costs and benefits of prepayment penalties.  Still, the evidence on 
loan interest rates is consistent with differential pricing of prepayment penalties as indicated by H2. 
 
5.3  Testing Hypothesis 3 
  27  LoanPerformance has very little information about borrowers other than FICO scores, so in order 
to test whether non-banks originate disproportionately more loans with prepayment penalties than banks 
do to borrowers who are less financially sophisticated or more financially constrained, I use three proxies:  
College, MedianIncome, and MedianAge.  Table 9 provides the percentages of loans that have 
prepayment penalties in each loan category, with the sample split by origination channel and by one of the 
proxies.  Both banks and non-banks originate a higher percentage of prepayment penalty loans in locales 
in which residents have lower educational levels, incomes, and ages, as indicated by all of the differences 
in the italicized rows being positive.  In every case, the differences are greater for non-bank-originated 
loans than for bank-originated loans.
40  Additionally, the disparity between the non-bank differences and 
bank differences is most pronounced for purchase and refinance ARMs and less pronounced for refinance 
FRMs, closely matching the pattern of results in Table 5.  To the extent that ZIP-code level education, 
income, and age figures are reasonable proxies for borrower financial sophistication and financial 
constraints, the evidence in Table 9 is consistent with H3. 
 
5.4  Testing Hypothesis 4 
State APL laws often have provisions restricting the length of time past origination during which 
a prepayment penalty can be charged on loans covered by the APL law, or restricting the amount of 
prepayment penalty that can be charged on covered loans.  Table 10 presents the coefficient estimates of 
NonBank from regressions similar to those in Table 5, with the samples split according to whether there 
was a state APL law in effect at the time of origination that restricted prepayment penalty durations 
(Panel A) or amounts (Panel B).
41  The left-hand sides of Panels A and B indicate that among loans 
                                                 
40 These results are consistent with other findings regarding borrower income, age, and education. Woodward (2008) 
finds that total charges paid at origination are strongly and negatively related to the percent of residents in a 
borrower’s census tract with a college education; Jiang et al. (2009) find that borrower income and age are both 
negatively related to the probability that a loan was originated by a broker; Berndt et al. (2010) find that broker 
profits are negatively related to the percent of residents in a borrower’s ZIP code with a Bachelor’s degree. 
41 Results for other variables are similar to those reported in Table 5, and are omitted here for brevity.  Complete 
results are available from the author.  As noted previously, there is a high degree of correlation between 
  28originated in times and places without the APL law provisions in effect, the pattern for NonBank found in 
Table 5 is strongly apparent.  Non-bank-originated loans have a higher probability of default only for 
loans with prepayment penalties.  The right-hand sides indicate that when and where the provisions are in 
effect, no association between origination channel and default is in evidence.  Consistent with H4, the 
positive relationship between non-bank origination and default risk only for prepayment penalty loans is 
not only weaker in the presence of state APL restrictions on prepayment penalties, but it disappears 
altogether.  It is important to note that there are endogeneity concerns regarding these findings, as a 
state’s prior mortgage default experience or other housing market conditions could influence both a 
state’s APL laws and subsequent loan outcomes.  A thorough analysis of the efficacy of state APL law 
provisions would need to address such concerns, but is beyond the scope of this paper.  That stated, the 
presented findings are consistent with the prediction based on compensation incentives across origination 
channels. 
  Turning to the prepayment equation results, the pattern of results is not as stable, but particularly 
for ARMs, non-bank origination is positively associated with the probability of prepayment when either 
APL law provision is in effect.  This is true both for loans with and without prepayment penalties.  While 
at first blush it seems unlikely that APL provisions addressing prepayment penalties should affect results 
concerning loans without prepayment penalties, a plausible explanation involves the high correlations of 
APL_Duration and APL_Amount to another type of APL law provision, one limiting the amount of points 
and fees that may be financed on covered loans.
42  This provision makes refinancing less costly regardless 
of prepayment penalties, and is plausibly more relevant for ARM borrowers who in many cases took 
adjustable-rate mortgages with the intention of refinancing prior to the initial rate reset.  If brokers, whose 
compensation relies more heavily on fee income than the compensation of direct lender loan officers, are 
more constrained by restrictions on points and fees than loan officers, and APL_Duration and 
                                                                                                                                                             
APL_Duration and APL_Amount.  For this reason, I make no conclusion regarding whether the results of Table 11 
more reflect the efficacy of restricting durations or restricting amounts. 
42 The correlation coefficients between APL_Duration and that APL law provision range from 0.42 to 0.51, 
depending on the loan category, and those between APL_Amount and that provision range from 0.34 to 0.48. 
  29APL_Amount capture those restrictions’ effects, then that would be consistent with the prepayment 
equation results from Table 10. 
 
6. Conclusion 
  This paper presents evidence that variation by origination channel in the probability of default, 
the pricing of prepayment penalties, and the incidence of prepayment penalties by borrower financial 
sophistication and financial constraints in subprime mortgages are all consistent with differing 
compensation incentives.  In particular, YSPs plausibly both are linked to prepayment penalties and 
provide greater incentives for non-bank originators than for bank originators to place borrowers in higher 
rate loans.  This is consistent with the finding that non-bank origination is associated with greater default 
risk for loans with prepayment penalties but not for loans without prepayment penalties, and the finding 
that non-banks price prepayment penalties less favorably to borrowers than banks do.  Compared to 
banks, non-banks also originate disproportionately more prepayment penalty loans to borrowers who are 
more likely to accept loans with higher interest rates.  Finally, state APL restrictions on the use of 
prepayment penalties eliminate the greater probability of default on non-bank-originated prepayment 
penalty loans. 
A few caveats are worthwhile here.  First, due to a lack of available data, no empirical results 
directly on YSPs are presented here.  This paper’s evidence on prepayment penalties is consistent with 
predictions based on YSPs, but that is a step short of evidence on YSPs.  Second, this paper’s findings 
concerning the pricing of prepayment penalties could be profitably revisited by researchers with access to 
richer datasets that include information on both loan interest rates and upfront costs to get a more 
complete picture of how prepayment penalties affect total loan costs.  Third, this paper’s findings do not 
imply any normative judgment regarding prepayment penalties.  Restrictions of prepayment penalties can 
prevent some defaults by allowing financially distressed borrowers to more easily pay off their loans 
through refinancings or sales, but can simultaneously harm other borrowers who must accept more 
expensive loans or be denied mortgage credit altogether because the option to reduce the lender’s 
  30prepayment risk in exchange for a lower interest rate (initially, at least) is no longer available.  Weighing 
these costs and benefits is beyond the scope of this paper.  The findings in this paper instead contribute to 
the positive conclusion that the relationships among origination channel, prepayment penalties, and 
default are consistent with the differing compensation incentives faced by bank versus non-bank 
originators. 
  These findings highlight how critical originator compensation incentives are to understanding 
mortgage performance in general and the recent subprime foreclosure crisis in particular.  They also 
suggest that going forward, certain provisions of the recent Dodd-Frank Act (see footnote 13) may be 
expected to reduce the disparity in default risk across origination channels by lowering the probability of 
default among non-bank originations. 
 
Appendix – APL Law Provision Variables 
 The  variables  APL_Duration and APL_Amount indicate state APL provisions in effect at the time 
of a loan’s origination that place greater restrictions on the use of prepayment penalties than the federal 
HOEPA statute does.  Under HOEPA, the duration of a prepayment penalty period on a covered mortgage 
is restricted to sixty months after origination if the borrower’s monthly debts are less than or equal to fifty 
percent of the borrower’s monthly gross income, with prepayment penalties being prohibited if the 
borrower’s debts exceed this level.  As detailed in Table A1, APL_Duration takes a value of one when 
and where a state’s APL law prohibits prepayment penalties on covered loans prior to sixty months after 
origination, and zero otherwise.  (Provisions regarding prepayment penalties in the sample states’ APL 
laws do not include monthly gross income criteria, and of course state APL laws cannot restrict 
prepayment penalties more strictly than HOEPA for those loans for which HOEPA prohibits them 
entirely.)  HOEPA does not restrict the amounts of prepayment penalties, so APL_Amount takes a value 
of one when and where a state’s APL law places any restriction on prepayment penalty amounts.
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Perfectly Transparent and Competitive Market,” American Economic Review 100:2 (2010), 511-515. Table 1:  Sample metropolitan statistical areas 
MSA foreclosure rates are from RealtyTrac, Inc. (2008), which defines the foreclosure rate as the percentage of total 
households entering some stage of foreclosure during the year 2007.  The numbers of sample loans reflect both loans 
for which the originators could be identified and those for which they could not.  The numbers of sample 
observations reflect loans for which the originators could be identified and the random selection of adjustable-rate 
purchase and refinance loans and fixed-rate refinance loans.  Population estimates as of July 1, 2007, are from the 
US Census Bureau. 
    Foreclosure rate  Sample loans  Sample observations  Population 
MSA  State(s)  Year-end  2007  Number Percent  Number  Percent  Number Percent 
Miami  FL  2.724  66,399 7.7%  335,125  9.1%  2,382,961 4.6% 
Atlanta  GA  2.531  95,544 11.1%  432,224  11.7%  5,261,296 10.2% 
Phoenix AZ  1.915  86,659  10.1%  340,363  9.2%  4,165,921  8.1% 
Chicago  IL  1.641  168,711 19.6%  634,006  17.2%  7,929,840 15.4% 
Los  Angeles  CA  1.360  194,677 22.7%  753,114  20.4%  9,807,870 19.1% 
San  Antonio  TX  1.067  24,676 2.9%  200,591  5.4%  1,984,921 3.9% 
Minneapolis  MN-WI  0.836  66,780 7.8%  228,828  6.2%  3,197,620 6.2% 
Baltimore  MD 0.734 53,678  6.2%  197,370  5.3%  2,663,805  5.2% 
New York  NJ-NY  0.518  69,378  8.1%  342,401  9.3%  11,627,931  22.6% 
Pittsburgh  PA  0.367  32,865 3.8%  232,681  6.3%  2,354,159 4.6% 




  36Table 2:  Comparison of loans with identified versus unidentified originators 
This table presents the numbers of loans and mean values of loan-level characteristics of loans for which the originators could be identified and loans for which 
the originators could not. 
   Number of loans    Origination amount    LTV at orgination 
   Identified  Unidentified  % identified   Identified Unidentified Difference   Identified Unidentified Difference 
Adjustable-rate refinances    295,271  113,046  72.31%   $200,167  $195,838  $4,329   78.28  79.01  -0.73 
Adjustable-rate purchases    145,605  63,126  69.76%   $198,051  $181,955  $16,096   84.72  86.01  -1.29 
Fixed-rate refinances    128,018  58,810  68.52%   $189,409  $195,378  -$5,969   73.19  73.17  0.02 
Fixed-rate purchases    19,140  12,657  60.19%   $195,040  $179,085  $15,955   83.64  87.05  -3.41 
         
   Percent with prepayment penalty    Percent with reduced documentation    Percent owner-occupied 
   Identified  Unidentified  Difference   Identified Unidentified Difference   Identified Unidentified Difference 
Adjustable-rate refinances    0.63  0.64  -0.01   0.36  0.33  0.03   0.95  0.95  0.00 
Adjustable-rate purchases    0.61  0.63  -0.02   0.49  0.44  0.05   0.89  0.90  -0.01 
Fixed-rate refinances    0.71  0.69  0.02   0.29  0.29  0.00   0.95  0.95  0.00 
Fixed-rate purchases    0.69  0.55  0.14   0.39  0.44  -0.05   0.90  0.82  0.08 
         
   Borrower FICO at origination    Months before first rate reset    Maturity in months 
   Identified  Unidentified  Difference   Identified Unidentified Difference   Identified Unidentified Difference 
Adjustable-rate refinances    587.74  592.42  -4.68   25.70  27.60  -1.90   ----  ----  ---- 
Adjustable-rate purchases    637.91  634.52  3.39   25.75  27.06  -1.31   ----  ----  ---- 
Fixed-rate refinances    626.72  623.08  3.64   ----  ----  ----   343.65  344.54  -0.89 
Fixed-rate purchases    655.86  665.85  -9.99   ----  ----  ----   356.99  356.64  0.35 
         
   Initial loan interest rate    Margin   Judicial  foreclosure  state 
   Identified  Unidentified  Difference   Identified Unidentified Difference   Identified Unidentified Difference 
Adjustable-rate refinances    7.86  7.71  0.15   5.98  6.47  -0.49   0.48  0.43  0.05 
Adjustable-rate purchases    7.71  7.80  -0.09   5.89  6.55  -0.66   0.48  0.42  0.06 
Fixed-rate refinances    7.41  7.34  0.07   ----  ----  ----   0.46  0.43  0.03 
Fixed-rate purchases    7.74  7.72  0.02   ----  ----  ----   0.48  0.45  0.03 
 
 
  37Table 3:  Variable definitions 
Quarterly MSA-level home price index values are from Freddie Mac’s conventional mortgage home price indices.  
Monthly MSA-level unemployment rates are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Monthly fixed-rate and adjustable-
rate mortgage interest rates are from Freddie Mac’s Primary Mortgage Market Survey (PMMS).  Bank prime loan rates 
are from the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis.  Resident education, income, age, tenure and house value data are 
from the 2000 Census.  Information on state foreclosure laws is from Ghent and Kudlyak (2010). 
Static loan characteristic variables: 
NonBank  Equals 0 if a loan is originated by a depository institution primarily supervised by the Federal 
Reserve, OCC, FDIC, OTS, or NCUA; 1 otherwise 
PrepayLoan  Equals 1 if the loan features a prepayment penalty; 0 otherwise 
LowNoDoc  Equals 1 if the loan is based on reduced documentation; 0 otherwise 
FICO  Borrower’s FICO score at origination 
RelLoanSize  Ratio of loan origination amount to the average origination amount of all sample loans of the same 
type (FRM or ARM) and purpose (purchase or refinance) originated in the same MSA and year 
Cashout  Equals 1 if the loan is a cashout refinance; 0 otherwise 
Judicial  Equals 1 if the state is a judicial foreclosure state; 0 if a non-judicial foreclosure state 
LTV  Loan-to-value ratio at origination 
InitialRate  Initial loan interest rate at origination 
Margin  Amount added to the index rate of the loan to compute the loan’s fully-indexed interest rate 
OwnerOcc  Equals 1 if the loan is for an owner-occupied property; 0 otherwise 
3/27ARM  Equals 1 if the initial interest rate is fixed for three years after origination; 0 if it is fixed for two years 
after origination 
30YearFRM  Equals 1 if the loan is a 30-year loan; 0 if it is a 15-year loan 
Time-varying loan characteristic variables: 
PrepayPen  Equals 1 if a prepayment penalty period is in effect during the entire current month; 0 otherwise 
PrepayPenEnd  Equals 1 in the month that a prepayment penalty ends and in the following two months; 0 otherwise 
CLTV  Current loan balance divided by current home value, where current home value is estimated as (1+ 
MSA home price appreciation since origination) multiplied by the loan amount at origination divided 
by the loan-to-value ratio at origination 
PaymentAdj  Percentage change in monthly payment at the time of the most recent interest rate reset, constrained to 
be non-negative and to equal 0 prior to the loan’s first scheduled rate reset 
Adj1st  Equals 1 in the month of the first scheduled rate reset and in the following two months; 0 otherwise 
PostAdj1st  Equals 1 three months or more after the first scheduled rate reset, 0 otherwise 
RefiPremium  Loan interest rate minus current PMMS 30-year or 15-year mortgage fixed rate, divided by the loan 
interest rate 
Age  Months since origination 
Macroeconomic, demographic, and anti-predatory lending law variables: 
Spread  Current PMMS 30-year mortgage fixed rate minus current PMMS 1-year adjustable rate 
ChgUnempl  Current monthly MSA unemployment rate minus the monthly MSA unemployment rate at origination 
VarHPI  Standard deviation of MSA home price index over the previous 8 quarters 
VarLIBOR  Standard deviation of 6-month London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) over the previous 24 months 
VarFixed  Standard deviation of PMMS 30-year or 15-year mortgage fixed rate over the previous 24 months 
College  Percentage of residents 25 years old or older with at least a Bachelor’s degree in borrower’s ZIP code 
MedianIncome  Median household income (in thousands) in borrower’s ZIP code 
MedianAge  Median resident age in borrower’s ZIP code 
PrimeRate  Monthly bank prime loan rate 
%Refinance  Percentage of all sample loans in a given loan’s ZIP code and origination year that are refinances 
%ShortTenure  Percentage of owner-occupied households in the borrower’s ZIP code who have lived in their current 
households for five years or less 
%AgeXX-YY  Percentage of residents in the borrower’s ZIP code between the ages of XX and YY 
%Value$X-$Y  Percentage of specified owner-occupied housing units in the borrower’s ZIP code valued between 
$X00,000 and $Y00,000 
APL_Duration  Equals 1 if a state’s APL law’s prohibition against prepayment penalties on covered loans takes effect 
sooner than five years after loan origination, 0 otherwise 
APL_Amount  Equals 1 if a state’s APL law restricts the maximum amount that can be charged as a prepayment 
penalty on a covered loan, 0 otherwise 
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Table 4:  Variable means by origination channel 
  Adjustable-rate purchases    Adjustable-rate refinances    Fixed-rate refinances 
 Bank  loans Non-bank  loans  Bank  loans Non-bank  loans  Bank  loans Non-bank  loans 
Loans  14,064 22,520    20,154 53,550    8,610  23,524 
Observations  333,211 502,656    432,981  1,104,561    282,594 759,867 
Static loan characteristic variables:           
PrepayLoan  0.62 0.62    0.68 0.61    0.70 0.73 
LowNoDoc  0.38 0.52    0.33 0.36    0.30 0.28 
FICO  634.10 635.08    593.66 586.88    635.22 630.34 
RelLoanSize  0.98 0.96    1.01 0.96    1.02 0.97 
Cashout  ---- ----    0.91  0.87    0.87 0.84 
Judicial  0.51 0.49    0.51 0.48    0.47 0.46 
LTV  85.22 84.39    79.30 78.62    73.23 72.66 
InitialRate  7.77 7.74    7.85 7.91    7.34 7.27 
Margin  5.93 5.86    5.92 5.99    ---- ---- 
OwnerOcc  0.90 0.89    0.93 0.94    0.94 0.94 
3/27ARM  0.10 0.20    0.13 0.17    ---- ---- 
30YearFRM  ---- ----    ---- ----    0.89 0.90 
Time-varying loan characteristic variables:           
PrepayPen  0.41 0.44    0.47 0.46    0.46 0.47 
PrepayPenEnd  0.04 0.04    0.04 0.03    0.03 0.03 
CLTV  77.61 75.46    71.87 70.15    62.41 60.83 
Age  20.50 19.58    20.15 19.24    27.55 26.34 
PaymentAdj  0.02 0.02    0.02 0.02    ---- ---- 
Adj1st  0.06 0.06    0.06 0.05    ---- ---- 
PostAdj1st  0.26 0.22    0.24 0.22    ---- ---- 
RefiPremium  ---- ----    ---- ----    0.17 0.16 
Macroeconomic, demographic, and anti-predatory lending law variables:     
ChgUnempl  0.13 -0.05    0.07 -0.10    0.08 -0.11 
VarHPI  16.11 19.69    17.89 19.59    19.48 21.80 
VarLIBOR  0.83 0.82    0.83 0.81    ---- ---- 
Spread  1.05 1.13    1.13 1.21    ---- ---- 
VarFixed  ---- ----    ---- ----    0.32 0.32 
College  21.30 19.94    22.46 21.20    22.27 21.02 
MedianIncome  46.78 45.33    48.47 46.87    47.57 45.84 
MedianAge  33.60 33.12    33.71 33.40    34.09 33.72 
PrimeRate  5.84 5.52    5.66 5.31    5.35 5.09 
%Refinance  0.63 0.65    0.69 0.69    0.70 0.70 
%ShortTenure  36.14 35.64    35.55 35.03    33.63 32.92 
%Age18-34  24.25 24.52    24.07 24.33    23.79 24.09 
%Age35-44  16.41 16.13    16.48 16.26    16.28 16.10 
%Age45-59  17.29 16.95    17.42 17.15    17.57 17.30 
%Age60-over  13.83 13.72    13.82 13.81    14.56 14.48 
%Value$1-$2  46.02 46.24    48.03 47.54    45.54 44.88 
%Value$2-$3  10.72 10.65    12.70 12.34    14.34 14.33 
%Value$3-$5  4.20 4.17    5.35 4.96    6.48 6.36 
%Value$5-over  1.40 1.45    1.87 1.68    2.53 2.45 
APL_Amount  0.67 0.61    0.64 0.60    0.61 0.57 
APL_Duration  0.79 0.75    0.74 0.71    0.76 0.79 
 Table 5:  Origination channel and the probabilities of default and prepayment 
This table presents results of multinomial logit regressions based on monthly data for subprime mortgages originated during 2002-2006.  Variables are defined as described in 
Table 3.  Each coefficient estimate represents the impact on the probability of a first foreclosure start or a prepayment, relative to the probability of a loan remaining active, of a 
one-unit change in the corresponding variable.  Vintage year indicators, MSA indicators, and a constant term are included in all specifications.  Robust standard errors clustered by 
both loan and month are in brackets.  Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
  Adjustable-rate purchases    Adjustable-rate refinances    Fixed-rate refinances 
  Default equation results    Default equation results    Default equation results 
  All loans  Prepays only  No prepays    All loans  Prepays only  No prepays    All loans  Prepays only  No prepays 
NonBank  0.0650** 0.0894** 0.0510    0.022  0.0634** -0.0288   0.0971*  0.115  0.0352 
 [0.0296]  [0.0348]  [0.0411]    [0.0266]  [0.0316]  [0.0422]    [0.0572] [0.0706] [0.0714] 
PrepayPen  -0.132***       -0.0834**       -0.159***     
  [0.0398]       [0.0355]       [0.0399]     
PrepayPenEnd  -0.0119       -0.0659       -0.0839     
  [0.0714]       [0.0709]       [0.0875]     
LowNoDoc  0.315*** 0.315*** 0.303***    0.429*** 0.431***  0.415***    0.413*** 0.407*** 0.418*** 
 [0.0241]  [0.0314]  [0.0363]    [0.0232]  [0.0272]  [0.0316]    [0.0425] [0.0524] [0.0652] 
Cashout         -0.0712**  -0.043  -0.108**   0.0882  0.054  0.116 
          [0.0346] [0.0435] [0.0462]    [0.0542]  [0.0633]  [0.0900] 
FICO  -0.0035*** -0.0039*** -0.0029***    -0.0054*** -0.0061***  -0.0042***    -0.0067*** -0.0065*** -0.0071*** 
 [0.000344]  [0.000415]  [0.000412]    [0.000484]  [0.000496]  [0.000539]    [0.000363] [0.000475] [0.000626] 
CLTV  0.0218*** 0.0238*** 0.0124***    0.0207*** 0.0218***  0.0153***    0.0279*** 0.0277*** 0.0241*** 
 [0.00148]  [0.00166]  [0.00215]    [0.00125]  [0.00150]  [0.00149]    [0.00157] [0.00196] [0.00269] 
PaymentAdj  1.111*** 1.686*** -0.024    1.255*** 1.417*** 0.841***         
  [0.295] [0.334] [0.372]    [0.214] [0.258] [0.275]         
Adj1st  -0.141*  -0.164**  0.00632   -0.163**  -0.188***  -0.102        
  [0.0732] [0.0701] [0.0886]    [0.0672] [0.0669] [0.0794]         
PostAdj1st  0.0589 -0.00999  0.274***    0.0137 0.0753 0.004        
  [0.0665] [0.0790] [0.0820]    [0.0571] [0.0666] [0.0728]         
Spread  -0.289*** -0.257*** -0.343***    -0.212*** -0.214*** -0.215**        
  [0.0744] [0.0854] [0.0965]    [0.0797] [0.0810] [0.109]        
RefiPremium              2.738***  2.948***  2.472*** 
              [0.202]  [0.259]  [0.323] 
Age  0.0689*** 0.0711*** 0.0707***    0.0934*** 0.0901***  0.0979***    0.0714*** 0.0758*** 0.0708*** 
 [0.00562]  [0.00607]  [0.00702]    [0.00534]  [0.00544]  [0.00757]    [0.00648] [0.00587] [0.00885] 
Age
2  -0.00080*** -0.00068*** -0.0011***  -0.00107*** -0.00100***  -0.0012***    -0.00072*** -0.00070*** -0.00080*** 
 [9.38e-05]  [9.16e-05]  [0.000123]    [8.24e-05]  [8.10e-05] [0.000133]    [0.000103] [8.77e-05]  [0.000151] 
RelLoanSize  0.189*** 0.179*** 0.211***    0.0929***  0.104***  0.0726**    0.182*** 0.215*** 0.142** 
  [0.0288] [0.0345] [0.0416]    [0.0189] [0.0236]  [0.0334]    [0.0346] [0.0400] [0.0596] 
ChgUnempl  -0.0461*** -0.0510*** -0.0272    -0.0470*** -0.0347**  -0.0603***    0.00548 0.00642 -0.0183 
  [0.0137] [0.0161] [0.0172]    [0.0119] [0.0149]  [0.0151]    [0.0177] [0.0224] [0.0256] 
VarHPI  -0.0146*** -0.0149*** -0.0228***    -0.00623** -0.00803*** -0.00794**   0.000819  -0.00192  -0.00245 
 [0.00255]  [0.00235]  [0.00431]    [0.00260]  [0.00252]  [0.00389]    [0.00271] [0.00264] [0.00644] 
VarLIBOR  -0.164*** -0.154**  -0.127*    -0.248*** -0.228*** -0.229***         
  [0.0585] [0.0768] [0.0725]    [0.0672] [0.0716] [0.0812]         
VarFixed              -1.382***  -1.178***  -1.405*** 
              [0.265]  [0.285]  [0.379] 
Judicial  -0.284 -0.300 -0.201    0.166  0.249 0.173    0.052  0.0567 0.0967 
  40 [0.196]  [0.410]  [0.277]    [0.167]  [0.258]  [0.214]    [0.338] [0.376] [0.858] 
  Prepayment equation results    Prepayment equation results    Prepayment equation results 
  All loans  Prepays only  No prepays    All loans  Prepays only  No prepays    All loans  Prepays only  No prepays 
NonBank  0.00501 0.00542 0.0470*    0.0422***  0.0281*  0.0455**    0.0756*** 0.0909*** 0.0708** 
 [0.0164]  [0.0204]  [0.0245]    [0.0127]  [0.0153]  [0.0212]    [0.0204] [0.0239] [0.0337] 
PrepayPen  -0.778***       -0.537***       -0.297***     
  [0.0222]       [0.0181]       [0.0300]     
PrepayPenEnd  0.352***       0.309***       0.263***     
  [0.0322]       [0.0231]       [0.0353]     
LowNoDoc  0.00584 -0.0268 0.0516*    -0.0445***  -0.0370** -0.0503**    0.00172  0.0239  -0.0697* 
 [0.0184]  [0.0196]  [0.0273]    [0.0158]  [0.0157]  [0.0236]    [0.0272] [0.0353] [0.0419] 
Cashout         0.0156  0.00715  0.0572***   0.0201  -0.0235  0.128*** 
          [0.0141] [0.0176] [0.0220]    [0.0269]  [0.0311]  [0.0412] 
FICO  0.00059*** 0.00013  0.00126***    -0.00069***  -0.00096***  -0.00031*   -0.00144*** -0.00195*** -0.00003 
 [0.000193]  [0.000227]  [0.000275]    [0.000154]  [0.000188]  [0.000180]    [0.000482] [0.000617] [0.000280] 
CLTV  -0.0119*** -0.0171*** -0.00164    -0.00467***  -0.00353** -0.0059***    0.00100  0.00440**  -0.00488*** 
 [0.00151]  [0.00164]  [0.00187]    [0.00114]  [0.00147]  [0.000943]    [0.00172] [0.00205] [0.00136] 
PaymentAdj  0.475*** 0.370**  0.533    0.589*** 0.640*** 0.653***         
  [0.179] [0.156] [0.380]    [0.142] [0.160] [0.219]         
Adj1st  0.396*** 1.293*** 0.497***    0.463*** 1.071*** 0.560***         
  [0.0680] [0.0617] [0.0697]    [0.0527] [0.0517] [0.0574]         
PostAdj1st  0.0808  0.657***  0.0955   0.0862  0.396***  0.203**        
  [0.0668] [0.0627] [0.100]   [0.0605] [0.0539] [0.0791]         
Spread  0.0743 0.109  -0.047    0.0057 0.0364 -0.0562         
  [0.0736] [0.0740] [0.0973]    [0.0645] [0.0670] [0.0718]         
RefiPremium              1.961***  1.682**  2.523*** 
              [0.490]  [0.685]  [0.155] 
Age  0.0818*** 0.101***  0.0711***    0.0631*** 0.0732***  0.0543***    0.0320*** 0.0458*** 0.0152** 
 [0.00770]  [0.00850]  [0.00902]    [0.00698]  [0.00705]  [0.00673]    [0.00698] [0.00734] [0.00625] 
Age
2  -0.00193*** -0.00218*** -0.0018***  -0.00153*** -0.00154***  -0.0015***    -0.00083*** -0.00092*** -0.00059*** 
 [0.000152]  [0.000162]  [0.000216]    [0.000124]  [0.000122]  [0.000143]    [0.000124] [0.000122] [0.000111] 
RelLoanSize  0.0905*** -0.00798  0.243***   0.103***  0.0436*** 0.199***   0.049  -0.054  0.224*** 
  [0.0170] [0.0205] [0.0285]    [0.0123] [0.0150]  [0.0184]    [0.0340] [0.0469] [0.0317] 
ChgUnempl  -0.130*** -0.117*** -0.146***    -0.165*** -0.177***  -0.132***    -0.145*** -0.144*** -0.126*** 
  [0.0159] [0.0182] [0.0205]    [0.0164] [0.0188]  [0.0176]    [0.0169] [0.0208] [0.0167] 
VarHPI  0.0263*** 0.0230*** 0.0253***    0.0251*** 0.0241***  0.0322***    0.0198*** 0.0195*** 0.0215*** 
 [0.00176]  [0.00190]  [0.00290]    [0.00119]  [0.00117]  [0.00248]    [0.00145] [0.00146] [0.00273] 
VarLIBOR  -0.253*** -0.279*** -0.118*    -0.349*** -0.419*** -0.237***         
  [0.0592] [0.0645] [0.0682]    [0.0580] [0.0605] [0.0604]         
VarFixed              -0.324*  -0.341*  -0.298 
              [0.171]  [0.181]  [0.225] 
Judicial  -0.140 0.0338  0.104   -0.235***  -0.00705  -0.189    -0.143 -0.165 -0.01 
 [0.139]  [0.243]  [0.181]    [0.0876]  [0.126]  [0.147]    [0.169] [0.196] [0.348] 
Observations 690,180  436,496  253,684    1,345,250  854,420  490,830    991,406 717,365 274,041 
Loans 36,583  22,242  14,341    73,678  46,117  27,561    32,118 23,003 9,115 
Pseudo-R
2 0.0697  0.0867  0.0421   0.0564  0.0659  0.0389    0.0532 0.0551 0.0490 
Log-likelihood -155,087  -95,376  -59,616    -301,373 -190,722 -110,632    -114,400  -82,361  -31,992 
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Table 6:  Coefficient estimates for NonBank in samples split by other potential risk factors 
This table presents the coefficient estimates for NonBank taken from results of multinomial logit regressions based on monthly data for subprime mortgages 
originated during 2002-2006.  Specifications are identical to those for all loans in Table 5, with samples split by LowNoDoc, RelLoanSize, LTV, FICO, College, 
MedianIncome, and MedianAge.  Variables are defined as described in Table 3.  Each coefficient estimate represents the impact on the probability of a first 
foreclosure start or a prepayment, relative to the probability of a loan remaining active, of a loan being non-bank-originated rather than bank-originated.  Vintage 
year indicators, MSA indicators, and a constant term are included in all specifications.  Robust standard errors clustered by both loan and month are in brackets.  
Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  Complete results are available upon request. 















At or above 
median 
Default equation                    
Adjustable-rate  purchases 0.0737**  0.0611*   0.0889**  0.0603*   0.240**  0.0605**   0.0364  0.116*** 
  [0.0334]  [0.0348]   [0.0408]  [0.0333]   [0.107]  [0.0304]   [0.0336]  [0.0418] 
Adjustable-rate  refinances 0.0533  -0.00038   0.0125  0.0339   0.0256  0.0248   0.00187  0.0648* 
  [0.0338]  [0.0316]   [0.0339]  [0.0321]   [0.0483]  [0.0287]   [0.0349]  [0.0352] 
Fixed-rate  refinances  0.115  0.0932*   0.0888  0.106   0.108  0.0995   0.121**  0.0873 
  [0.0913]  [0.0552]   [0.0637]  [0.0698]   [0.0743]  [0.0663]   [0.0616]  [0.0828] 
Prepayment equation                    
Adjustable-rate  purchases 0.0225  -0.00652   -0.00161  0.0103   -0.0848  0.0119   0.00492  0.0137 
  [0.0217]  [0.0213]   [0.0234]  [0.0201]   [0.0581]  [0.0174]   [0.0234]  [0.0211] 
Adjustable-rate  refinances 0.0169  0.0548***   0.0430*** 0.0373**   0.0373**  0.0382**   0.0333*** 0.0508*** 
  [0.0211]  [0.0148]   [0.0155]  [0.0173]   [0.0175]  [0.0167]   [0.0129]  [0.0196] 
Fixed-rate  refinances  0.0125  0.104***   0.0875*** 0.0642**   0.106***  0.0329   0.0714*** 0.0858*** 
  [0.0363]  [0.0219]   [0.0229]  [0.0302]   [0.0287]  [0.0265]   [0.0249]  [0.0302] 
                    
  College-educated by ZIP    Median income by ZIP    Median age by ZIP      
 Below 
median 












Default equation                    
Adjustable-rate  purchases 0.108***  0.0114   0.117***  0.0104   0.0861**  0.0290      
  [0.0355]  [0.0359]   [0.0406]  [0.0349]   [0.0370]  [0.0374]      
Adjustable-rate  refinances 0.0138  0.0213   0.0209  0.0178   0.0437  -0.00259      
  [0.0313]  [0.0321]   [0.0345]  [0.0353]   [0.0350]  [0.0351]      
Fixed-rate  refinances  0.00109  0.194***   0.00713  0.188***   0.00947  0.185***      
  [0.0686]  [0.0675]   [0.0733]  [0.0611]   [0.0693]  [0.0606]      
Prepayment equation                    
Adjustable-rate  purchases 0.0175  -0.00685   0.0389*  -0.0303   0.0417*  -0.0269      
  [0.0225]  [0.0226]   [0.0222]  [0.0233]   [0.0232]  [0.0225]      
Adjustable-rate  refinances 0.0536***  0.0290*   0.0553*** 0.0276*   0.0592*** 0.0259*      
  [0.0167]  [0.0170]   [0.0176]  [0.0147]   [0.0187]  [0.0139]      
Fixed-rate  refinances  0.0609**  0.0779***   0.0912*** 0.0542**   0.0835*** 0.0604**      
  [0.0284]  [0.0255]   [0.0249]  [0.0258]   [0.0295]  [0.0249]      Table 7a:  Prepayment penalties and interest rate margins – adjustable-rate purchase mortgages 
This table presents results of 2SLS and IV probit regressions based on loan-level data for subprime adjustable-rate purchase 
mortgages originated during 2002-2006.  Variables are defined as described in Table 3.  Panel A employs predicted 
probabilities of a loan having a prepayment penalty derived from the results of a probit specification similar to the IV probit 
specification shown but excluding Margin.  Vintage year indicators, MSA indicators, and a constant term are included in all 
specifications.  Robust standard errors clustered by month are in brackets.  Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, 
and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
  Panel A: 2SLS  Panel B: 2SLS  Panel C: IV probit 
 Dependent  variable:  Margin Dependent  variable:  LTV Dependent  variable:  PrepayLoan 


















Pr(PrepayLoan)  1.587*** 0.628*** 1.706***             
 [0.0430]  [0.0841]  [0.0472]             
Margin      -0.120  5.370***  -1.263***  4.599***  1.857***  0.335 
       [0.226]  [0.663]  [0.249]  [1.604]  [0.207]  [0.327] 
LTV  0.0172*** 0.0190*** 0.0149***             
 [0.00190]  [0.00325]  [0.00219]             
NonBank  -0.0193***     -0.487***      0.275     
 [0.00556]      [0.0484]      [0.172]     
FICO  -0.0036*** -0.0049*** -0.0029*** 0.0175***  0.0558*** 0.00503*** 0.0152***  0.00776*** 0.000849 
 [5.71e-05]  [0.000134]  [5.60e-05]  [0.000851] [0.00296]  [0.000854]  [0.00535] [0.000915] [0.000929]
LowNoDoc  0.260*** 0.358*** 0.179***  -2.437***  -4.857***  -1.755*** -0.895***  -0.709***  -0.147*** 
  [0.00711]  [0.0156] [0.00728]  [0.0565] [0.185]  [0.0608]  [0.255] [0.0561] [0.0400] 
RelLoanSize  -0.0882*** -0.129***  -0.0458*** 3.332***  3.179*** 3.777***  0.341** 0.229*** -0.0782***
 [0.00587]  [0.00900]  [0.00743]  [0.0526]  [0.103]  [0.0682]  [0.140] [0.0313] [0.0199] 
OwnerOcc  -0.188*** -0.267*** -0.162***  -2.260*** 1.211*** -3.502***  0.979***  0.462*** 0.262*** 
  [0.00921]  [0.0145] [0.0120]  [0.0794] [0.235]  [0.0882]  [0.311] [0.0687] [0.0469] 
3/27ARM  0.0925*** 0.0284  0.0697***  0.129**  0.409***  0.165** -0.177***  -0.446***  -0.144*** 
  [0.00787]  [0.0199] [0.00765]  [0.0587] [0.138] [0.0665]  [0.0539]  [0.0369]  [0.0167] 
PrimeRate  -0.00483 -0.0986***  0.0528***            
  [0.00604] [0.0109]  [0.00688]             
%Age18-34      0.0120*  0.0105  0.0186**      
      [0.00715]  [0.0132]  [0.00899]      
%Age35-44      0.0199  0.0794***  -0.0345*      
      [0.0148]  [0.0276]  [0.0185]      
%Age45-59      0.0375***  0.00957  0.0570***      
      [0.0120]  [0.0214]  [0.0153]      
%Age60+      0.00329  0.0345***  -0.0141*      
      [0.00594]  [0.0111]  [0.00739]      
%Value$1-$2      -0.0364*** -0.0372*** -0.0373***     
       [0.00118]  [0.00222]  [0.00147]       
%Value$2-$3      -0.0608*** -0.0706*** -0.0583***     
       [0.00268]  [0.00506]  [0.00330]       
%Value$3-$5      -0.0816*** -0.0757*** -0.0808***     
       [0.00450]  [0.00867]  [0.00549]       
%Value$5+      -0.153***  -0.124***  -0.155***      
       [0.00532]  [0.0108]  [0.00645]       
%Refinance          -0.438***  0.152  -0.326*** 
          [0.169]  [0.116]  [0.0769] 
%ShortTenure          -0.209*  -0.230**  -0.202*** 
          [0.118]  [0.105]  [0.0603] 
APL_Duration          1.023**  -0.137***  -0.502*** 
          [0.517]  [0.0455]  [0.149] 
Observations 146,710 56,094  90,616  146,710 56,094  90,616  145,413  55,569  89,844 
R
2  0.121 0.151 0.147  0.103 -0.0279  0.0558       
F-statistic  775 367 696  627 282 361       
χ




  43Table 7b:  Prepayment penalties and interest rate margins – adjustable-rate refinance mortgages 
This table presents results of 2SLS and IV probit regressions based on loan-level data for subprime adjustable-rate 
refinance mortgages originated during 2002-2006.  Variables are defined as described in Table 3.  Panel A employs 
predicted probabilities of a loan having a prepayment penalty derived from the results of a probit specification similar to the 
IV probit specification shown but excluding Margin.  Vintage year indicators, MSA indicators, and a constant term are 
included in all specifications.  Robust standard errors clustered by month are in brackets.  Levels of significance are 
indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
  Panel A: 2SLS  Panel B: 2SLS  Panel C: IV probit 
 Dependent  variable:  Margin Dependent  variable:  LTV Dependent  variable:  PrepayLoan 


















Pr(PrepayLoan)  0.861*** 0.521*** 0.901***             
 [0.0222]  [0.0802]  [0.0213]             
Margin      -8.246***  4.665***  -9.644***  0.252  1.711***  7.890** 
       [0.401]  [0.884]  [0.393]  [0.284]  [0.177]  [3.266] 
LTV  0.00612*** 0.0126***  0.00377***            
 [0.000453]  [0.00109]  [0.000474]             
NonBank  0.0691***     -0.0778     -0.490***     
  [0.00445]     [0.0577]     [0.00967]     
FICO  -0.0050*** -0.0060*** -0.0046*** 0.0131*** 0.0819*** 0.00651*** 0.00109  0.00896*** 0.0349** 
 [4.08e-05]  [9.38e-05]  [4.35e-05]  [0.00195] [0.00477] [0.00185]  [0.00133]  [0.000953]  [0.0145] 
LowNoDoc  0.130*** 0.384*** 0.0388***  -1.368***  -4.415***  -1.887*** -0.0415  -0.629***  -0.243** 
 [0.00381]  [0.00874]  [0.00410]  [0.0719]  [0.315] [0.0654]  [0.0329]  [0.0624]  [0.0999] 
RelLoanSize  -0.105*** -0.115*** -0.0968*** 9.733*** 8.002*** 10.84***  -0.0377 0.0578***  0.642** 
 [0.00417]  [0.00788]  [0.00485]  [0.0681]  [0.0978] [0.0831]  [0.0261]  [0.0208] [0.283] 
OwnerOcc  -0.0963*** -0.207***  -0.0581*** 0.847***  4.066*** 0.274*  -0.157***  0.220*** 0.571 
  [0.00766] [0.0157]  [0.00857]  [0.124]  [0.236] [0.144]  [0.0377]  [0.0447]  [0.356] 
3/27ARM  0.0191*** -0.0294*  0.00254  -0.12  0.203 0.117  -0.246***  -0.352***  0.0344 
  [0.00513]  [0.0161] [0.00532]  [0.0750] [0.158] [0.0861]  [0.0127]  [0.0292]  [0.0762] 
Cashout  -0.000207 0.119*** -0.0417*** -1.517*** -1.040*** -2.200***  -0.115***  -0.265*** 0.422* 
  [0.00543]  [0.0127] [0.00579]  [0.0813] [0.165] [0.0967]  [0.0130]  [0.0328]  [0.240] 
PrimeRate  -0.0186*** -0.0953*** 0.0161***             
  [0.00423] [0.00925] [0.00459]             
%Age18-34      -0.0879*** -0.0676*** -0.0905***     
      [0.00867]  [0.0138]  [0.0103]      
%Age35-44      0.320***  0.289***  0.332***      
      [0.0184]  [0.0292]  [0.0218]      
%Age45-59      -0.0386*** 0.00887  -0.0535***     
      [0.0148]  [0.0230]  [0.0178]      
%Age60+      -0.0459*** -0.0123  -0.0402***     
      [0.00741]  [0.0121]  [0.00879]      
%Value$1-$2      -0.0869*** -0.0668*** -0.0933***     
       [0.00152]  [0.00241]  [0.00179]       
%Value$2-$3      -0.192***  -0.156***  -0.199***      
       [0.00320]  [0.00528]  [0.00377]       
%Value$3-$5      -0.243***  -0.205***  -0.259***      
       [0.00511]  [0.00808]  [0.00607]       
%Value$5+      -0.444***  -0.345***  -0.450***      
       [0.00634]  [0.0112]  [0.00745]       
%Refinance          -0.0686*  0.779***  -1.609***
          [0.0391]  [0.112]  [0.601] 
%ShortTenure          -0.0619*  -0.0202  -0.563** 
          [0.0334]  [0.0826]  [0.261] 
APL_Duration          -0.483***  0.107***  1.695 
          [0.0709] [0.0309]  [1.072] 
Observations 297,406 82,172  215,234  297,406 82,172  215,234  294,436  80,846  213,590 
R
2 0.154  0.165  0.178  -0.163  0.188  -0.185       
F-statistic  2,315  671 2,125 2,210  881 1,685      
χ
2          123,032  12,680  8,136 
 
  44Table 7c:  Prepayment penalties and initial loan rates – fixed-rate refinance mortgages 
This table presents results of 2SLS and IV probit regressions based on loan-level data for subprime fixed-rate refinance 
mortgages originated during 2002-2006.  Variables are defined as described in Table 3.  Panel A employs predicted 
probabilities of a loan having a prepayment penalty derived from the results of a probit specification similar to the IV probit 
specification shown but excluding InitialRate.  Vintage year indicators, MSA indicators, and a constant term are included in 
all specifications.  Robust standard errors clustered by month are in brackets.  Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, 
and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
  Panel A: 2SLS  Panel B: 2SLS  Panel C: IV probit 
 Dependent  variable:  InitialRate Dependent  variable:  LTV Dependent  variable:  PrepayLoan 


















Pr(PrepayLoan)  -0.708***  -2.033***  -0.573***         
  [0.0561]  [0.175]  [0.0504]         
InitialRate      -4.174***  -0.415  -5.381***  -0.0649  -0.304**  0.18 
        [0.384] [0.515] [0.505]  [0.106] [0.148] [0.117] 
LTV  0.00912***  0.00950***  0.00858***        
  [0.000449]  [0.00101]  [0.000491]         
NonBank  0.0549***     0.225**      -0.0269     
  [0.00576]      [0.0922]     [0.0294]    
FICO  -0.0090*** -0.0093*** -0.0089*** -0.0216*** 0.0105** -0.0319*** -0.000826  -0.00319** 0.00158 
 [4.31e-05]  [9.56e-05]  [4.77e-05]  [0.00347] [0.00477] [0.00453]  [0.000946]  [0.00134] [0.00102]
LowNoDoc  0.369*** 0.209*** 0.391***  0.0953  -1.217***  0.527** -0.0754*  -0.171***  -0.0443 
 [0.00575]  [0.0179]  [0.00636]  [0.168]  [0.242]  [0.219]  [0.0423] [0.0628] [0.0459] 
RelLoanSize  -0.340*** -0.274*** -0.363***  14.12*** 12.03*** 15.25***  0.0901***  -0.0248  0.181*** 
 [0.00645]  [0.0124]  [0.00749]  [0.120]  [0.176]  [0.159]  [0.0335] [0.0434] [0.0339] 
OwnerOcc  -0.530*** -0.438*** -0.563***  -1.835*** 1.489*** -3.282***  -0.318***  -0.138*  -0.401***
  [0.0118] [0.0229] [0.0137]  [0.252]  [0.371]  [0.331]  [0.0640] [0.0800] [0.0841] 
30YearFRM  0.187*** 0.325*** 0.168***  8.881*** 9.077*** 8.587***  0.172*** 0.340*** 0.00385 
 [0.00995]  [0.0255]  [0.0109]  [0.168]  [0.287]  [0.204]  [0.0364] [0.0478] [0.0390] 
Cashout  0.0749*** 0.143***  0.0564***  -0.834*** 0.0766  -1.244*** -0.0846***  0.0412  -0.159***
  [0.00749] [0.0169]  [0.00820]  [0.120]  [0.244]  [0.136]  [0.0246] [0.0422] [0.0313] 
PrimeRate  0.293***  0.403***  0.255***         
  [0.00717]  [0.0162]  [0.00783]         
%Age18-34      -0.173***  -0.220***  -0.150***     
      [0.0139]  [0.0255]  [0.0165]     
%Age35-44      0.300***  0.385***  0.251***     
      [0.0286]  [0.0523]  [0.0339]     
%Age45-59      -0.180***  -0.219***  -0.148***     
      [0.0244]  [0.0442]  [0.0290]     
%Age60+      -0.0656*** -0.0874*** -0.0586***    
      [0.0116]  [0.0214]  [0.0138]     
%Value$1-$2      -0.151***  -0.117***  -0.164***     
      [0.00279]  [0.00487]  [0.00338]     
%Value$2-$3      -0.268***  -0.221***  -0.289***     
      [0.00510]  [0.00897]  [0.00618]     
%Value$3-$5      -0.367***  -0.339***  -0.378***     
      [0.00727]  [0.0132]  [0.00864]     
%Value$5+      -0.572***  -0.515***  -0.595***     
      [0.00805]  [0.0140]  [0.00976]     
%Refinance              0.550*** 0.497*** 0.597*** 
             [0.0944]  [0.150]  [0.103] 
%ShortTenure              0.0889 0.0547 0.151* 
             [0.0791]  [0.113]  [0.0884] 
APL_Duration          0.672***  0.183*  1.005*** 
             [0.132] [0.0958]  [0.174] 
Observations 129,682 35,395  94,287  129,682 35,395  94,287  127,946 34,411  93,535 
R
2  0.513  0.463  0.540  0.206  0.299  0.177     
F-statistic  5,853  1,349  4,968  1,765  553  1,317     
χ
2             19,839  4,967  22,948 
 
  45Table 8:  Estimated loan interest rate changes associated with prepayment penalties 
This table presents estimates of the change in Margin and InitialRate associated with a loan having a prepayment penalty.  
Estimates are calculated as the coefficient estimate for Pr(PrepayLoan) from Panel A of Tables 7a-7c multiplied by the 
difference between the average value of Pr(PrepayLoan) for loans that do have a prepayment penalty and the average value 
of Pr(PrepayLoan) for loans that do not have a prepayment penalty. 
Panel A  Estimate for  Average Pr(PrepayLoan) Change  in 
  Pr(PrepayLoan)  PrepayLoan = 1  PrepayLoan = 0  Margin 
Adjustable-rate purchases        
All loans  1.587***  0.789 0.329  0.731 
Bank loans  0.628***  0.759 0.373  0.243 
Non-bank loans  1.706***  0.827 0.273  0.944 
Adjustable-rate refinances        
All loans  0.861***  0.822 0.291  0.457 
Bank loans  0.521***  0.782 0.441  0.178 
Non-bank loans  0.901***  0.853 0.226  0.564 
        
Panel B  Estimate for  Average Pr(PrepayLoan) Change  in 
  Pr(PrepayLoan)  PrepayLoan = 1  PrepayLoan = 0  InitialRate 
Fixed-rate refinances       
All loans  -0.708***  0.853 0.367  -0.344 
Bank loans  -2.033***  0.774 0.487  -0.585 
Non-bank loans  -0.573***  0.893 0.283  -0.350 
 
  46Table 9:  Percentages of loans with prepayment penalties by origination channel and financial sophistication proxies 
This table presents the percentage of loans with prepayment penalties in samples split by whether loans are originated by 
non-banks or banks and by whether loans are for properties in ZIP codes with below or above median values of College, 
MedianIncome, and MedianAge.  T-tests indicate that all differences are statistically significant at the 0.01% level. 













Percent college-educated               
Below median  66.0%  63.8%    67.1%  70.8%    74.8%  70.6% 
At or above median  56.0% 58.6%   54.4% 63.9%   69.4% 65.8% 
Difference 10.0%  5.2%    12.7% 6.9%    5.4% 4.8% 
Median household income              
Below median  68.3%  65.4%    69.0%  71.6%    74.9%  70.5% 
At or above median  53.5% 57.3%   52.6% 63.3%   69.4% 66.0% 
Difference 14.8%  8.1%    16.5% 8.4%    5.6% 4.4% 
Median age               
Below median  68.4%  63.2%    71.0%  72.6%    76.9%  70.4% 
At or above median  52.9% 59.0%   50.7% 62.4%   67.1% 65.9% 
Difference 15.5%  4.2%    20.3% 10.2%    9.8% 4.5% 
 
 
  47Table 10:  Coefficient estimates for NonBank in samples split by prepayment penalty APL law provisions 
This table presents the coefficient estimates for NonBank taken from results of multinomial logit regressions based on 
monthly data for subprime mortgages originated during 2002-2006.  Specifications are identical to those in Table 5, with 
samples split by APL_Duration and APL_Amount.  Variables are defined as described in Table 3.  Each coefficient estimate 
represents the impact on the probability of a first foreclosure start or a prepayment, relative to the probability of a loan 
remaining active, of a loan being non-bank-originated rather than bank-originated.  Vintage year indicators, MSA 
indicators, and a constant term are included in all specifications.  Robust standard errors clustered by both loan and month 
are in brackets.  Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  Complete results 
are available upon request. 
Panel A  Prepayment penalties allowed 
beyond five years after origination 
(APL_Duration = 0) 
  Prepayment penalties prohibited 
beyond five years after origination 
(APL_Duration = 1) 
  Prepays only  No prepays    Prepays only  No prepays 
Default equation         
Adjustable-rate purchases  0.241***  0.130    0.0119  0.0431 
  [0.0603] [0.109]    [0.0402] [0.0429] 
Adjustable-rate refinances  0.113**  -0.00211    0.0148  -0.0302 
  [0.0509] [0.0986]    [0.0368] [0.0456] 
Fixed-rate refinances  0.194**  0.0459    0.0934  0.0365 
  [0.0955] [0.170]    [0.0797] [0.0744] 
Prepayment equation         
Adjustable-rate purchases  -0.0603**  -0.00785    0.0416*  0.0626** 
  [0.0303] [0.0624]    [0.0225] [0.0250] 
Adjustable-rate refinances  -0.0119  0.0633    0.0597***  0.0514** 
  [0.0281] [0.0442]    [0.0176] [0.0231] 
Fixed-rate  refinances  0.160*** 0.0527   0.0694** 0.0640 
  [0.0482] [0.0588]    [0.0274] [0.0413] 
         
Panel B  No restriction on amount 
of prepayment penalty 
(APL_Amount = 0) 
  Amount of prepayment 
penalty is restricted 
(APL_Amount = 1) 
  Prepays only  No prepays    Prepays only  No prepays 
Default equation         
Adjustable-rate purchases  0.129***  0.0362    0.0443  0.0555 
  [0.0489] [0.0693]    [0.0505] [0.0472] 
Adjustable-rate  refinances  0.101** -0.0735    0.00317 -0.00883 
  [0.0463] [0.0794]    [0.0423] [0.0455] 
Fixed-rate  refinances  0.147* 0.212    0.0883 0.00964 
  [0.0772] [0.158]    [0.0953] [0.0720] 
Prepayment equation         
Adjustable-rate purchases  -0.0262  0.0452    0.0347  0.0518** 
  [0.0261] [0.0472]    [0.0277] [0.0264] 
Adjustable-rate refinances  -0.00357  0.0578    0.0620***  0.0486** 
  [0.0253] [0.0403]    [0.0176] [0.0244] 
Fixed-rate refinances  0.169***  0.106*    0.0387  0.0539 
  [0.0371] [0.0588]    [0.0300] [0.0400] 
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Table A1:  APL_Duration and APL_Amount values 
This table presents the values for APL_Duration and APL_Amount used in this paper’s analyses, based on the author’s 
examination of each sample state’s APL laws.  Sample loans were originated between Jan. 2002 and Dec. 2006. 
  APL_Duration   APL_Amount 
State  Dates Value   Dates Value 
Arizona  Jan. 2002-Dec. 2006  0    Jan. 2002-Dec. 2006  0 
California  Jan. 2002-Dec. 2006  1    Jan. 2002-Dec. 2006  1 
Florida  Jan. 2002-Sept. 2002 
Oct. 2002-Dec. 2006 
0 
1    Jan. 2002-Dec. 2006  0 
Georgia  Jan. 2002-Sept. 2002 
Oct. 2002-Dec. 2006 
0 
1    Jan. 2002-Sept. 2002 
Oct. 2002-Dec. 2006 
0 
1 
Illinois  Jan. 2002-Dec. 2003 
Jan. 2004-Dec. 2006 
0 
1    Jan. 2002-Dec. 2003 
Jan. 2004-Dec. 2006 
0 
1 
Maryland  Jan. 2002-Sept. 2002 
Oct. 2002-Dec. 2006 
0 
1    Jan. 2002-Sept. 2002 
Oct. 2002-Dec. 2006 
0 
1 
Minnesota  Jan. 2002-Dec. 2006  1    Jan. 2002-Dec. 2006  1 
New Jersey  Jan. 2002-Dec. 2006  0    Jan. 2002-Dec. 2006  0 
New York  Jan. 2002-Dec. 2006  1    Jan. 2002-Dec. 2006  0 
Pennsylvania  Jan. 2002-Dec. 2006  0    Jan. 2002-Dec. 2006  0 
Texas  Jan. 2002-Dec. 2006  1    Jan. 2002-Dec. 2006  1 
Wisconsin  Jan. 2002-Jan. 2005 
Feb. 2005-Dec. 2006 
0 
1    Jan. 2002-Jan. 2005 
Feb. 2005-Dec. 2006 
0 
1 
 
 
 